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The “Fetal Protection” Wars: Why America Has Made the Wrong Choice  
in Addressing Maternal Substance Abuse  - A Comparative Legal Analysis 
         
INTRODUCTION 
 On December 21, 2007 Theresa Hernandez was sentenced in Oklahoma City to 
fifteen years in prison for second degree murder, based on her delivery of a stillborn child 
and her admission that she took methamphetamine while pregnant.  There is no reliable 
evidence linking stillbirths to methamphetamine use,1 but Hernandez is only the latest of 
scores of American women targeted in a national crusade against “fetal abuse,” who have 
been prosecuted, and sentenced to lengthy prison terms based on their use of legal and 
illegal drugs while pregnant.2   This crusade began in the late 1980s, with the prosecution of 
                                                          
1 Ms. Hernandez was initially charged with first degree murder and faced a life sentence.  After having 
being held in county jail awaiting trial for three years without being able to have her children visit her, she 
entered a guilty plea to second degree murder.  Dana Stone, Is Meth Murder Charge Useful?, The 
Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK), Dec, 19, 2007. 
2 The first reported effort at prosecution was in 1989 in Winnebago County, Illinois, for involuntary 
manslaughter, but the grand jury refused to indict.  Marcella S. Kreiter, Cocaine Mothers and Cocaine 
Babies, UPI May 27, 1989, BC cycle.  Since then, at least 25 states have prosecuted women for murder, 
manslaughter, child abuse or endangerment, or drug delivery to a minor.  Lynn Paltrow, Punishing 
Pregnant Women for Their Behavior During Pregnancy, at www.crlp.org/pub_bp_punwom_page3.html.  
The following cases are those for which either a published decision, other court document, or newspaper 
article is available.  State v. Reinesto, 894 P.2d 733 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 912, (1977), Jaurigue v. People, No. 18988, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 1992); People v. 
Stewart, No. M508197, Transcript of Hearing (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987); State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 
338 (Fla. 1997); Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 
App. 1991); State v. Carter, No. 89-6274, slip op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 23, 1990), aff'd, 602 So. 2d 995, 996 
(Fla. App. 1992); Hillman v. State, 503 S.E. 2d 610 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998), State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P. 3d 1210 (Haw. 2005); People v. Bedenkop, 252 Ill. App. 3d 
419, 192 Ill. Dec. 163, 652 N.E.2d (1st Dist. 1993); State v. Barnett, No. 02D04-9308-CF-611, Order (Ind. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 11, 1994); Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); Kilmon v. State, 905 
A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 
1990); People v. Hardy, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991), People v. Bremer, No. 137619 (Mich. Ct. App. 
July 14, 1992), People v. Cox, No. 90-53454 FH, slip op. (Mich. Cir. Ct. July 9, 1990), aff'd, No. 131999 
(Mich. App. Feb. 28, 1992); State v. Lewis, Case 03CR113048, Chariton County, Missouri Circuit Ct.; 
State v. Arandus, No. 93072, slip op. (Neb. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1993); New Jersey v. Barker, No. 96-02-605, 
Tr. of hearing at 30-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 1997); People v. Morabito, slip op. (N.Y. Ont. Cty. Ct. Sept. 
24, 1992), aff'g, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Geneva City Ct. Jan. 28, 1992), People v. Morabito, 580 N.Y.S.2d 843 
(Geneva City Ct. Jan. 28, 1992), aff'd, slip op. (N.Y. Ont. Cty. Ct. Sept. 24, 1992); Sheriff, Washoe 
County, Nevada v. Encoe, 110 Nev. 1317, 885 P.2d 596 (Nev. 1994); State v. Inzar, Nos. 90CRS6960, 
90CRS6961, slip op. (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1991), No. 9116SC778 (N.C. App. Aug. 30, 1991); State v. 
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women who used cocaine while pregnant for crimes like child endangerment and delivery of 
drug to a minor, but in the last several years this crusade has become a veritable holy war, 
accelerating in intensity and scope.  Since 1999, more than thirty American women have 
been indicted for using alcohol or other drugs while pregnant, charged with crimes ranging 
from child abuse to first degree murder, and have received prison sentences of up to twenty 
years.  
 The American “fetal protection” movement is unique among developed and 
developing nations.  While other nations also have populations of poor women whose lives 
are highly dysfunctional or who are addicted to alcohol and other drugs, only in the United 
States are these women treated as criminals or civilly committed based on their conduct 
while pregnant.  Only in the United States do prosecutors take the position that embryos and 
fetuses should be protected as full human beings while in utero.  At the same time, the 
United States stands alone among developed countries in failing to guarantee access to 
health care to women and children throughout their lives and in failing to provide other 
economic, legal, and social supports (including treatment for drug and alcohol addiction) in 
order to increase the chances that women can nurture and provide for their children, as well 
as reduce the incidence of women’s addiction. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992), State v. Andrews, No. JU 68459, slip op. (Ohio C.P. June 19, 1989); 
State v. Alexander, No. CF-92-2047, Transcript of Decision (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Kemp, No. 114-Pitt-1993, Judgment, slip op. (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 1994), aff'g, 75 
Westmoreland L.J. 5, slip op. (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 16, 1992), Commonwealth v. Kemp, 75 Westmoreland L.J. 
5, slip op. (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 16, 1992), aff'd 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); State v. Eagle Hawk, 411 
N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1987); Ward v. State, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2371 (Tex Ct. App. March 29, 2006), 
Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, No. A-44116-01, slip 
op. (Va. Dist. Ct. Oct. 9, 1991).  Commonwealth v. Smith, No. CR-91-05-4381, slip op. (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
16, 1991),  Commonwealth v. Turner, No. 91-054382, slip op. (Va. Cir. Ct. Sept. 16, 1991);  State v. Dunn, 
916 P.2d 952 (Wash. App. 1996);  State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490 (Wis. App. 1999); Judge Drops 
‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005, State v. State v. Osmus, 276 P.2d 
469 (Wy. 1954). South Carolina is the only state in which convictions of pregnant drug users have been 
upheld.  Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (upholding child abuse conviction under 
child endangerment statute for prenatal drug use); State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). 
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What is noteworthy about the women targeted by “fetal protection” warriors are the 
many ways in which the women are already marginalized.  In addition to their to alcohol or 
drug addiction, the overwhelming majority of these women have histories of mental illness 
and/or mental retardation, and there is significant evidence that much of their drug use is an 
attempt to self-medicate for depression or other illnesses.3 These women are 
disproportionately women of color and almost always living in poverty.4  In many cases, they 
are victims of childhood sexual abuse and current domestic violence.5        
In this paper I will pursue four lines of inquiry.  First, I will briefly chronicle the 
history of criminal prosecution of pregnant women in America and show how these 
prosecutions have become markedly more aggressive over the last twenty years. Second, I 
will situate these prosecutions in the full context of American law, demonstrating how the 
fetus has increasingly been given legal recognition in a wide variety of circumstances.  I will 
argue here that “fetal protection” prosecutions are part of a broader attack on women’s 
rights, including not only the right to reproductive freedom but also the right to control 
other aspects of their economic and private lives.  I will contrast the fetal protection 
movement’s focus on denying abortion access, creating crimes for fetal harm, and protecting 
embryonic and fetal life in other ways, with the failure of American government to provide 
                                                          
3 See Women’s Law Project, Responding to the Needs of Pregnant and Parenting Women with Substance 
Use Disorders in Philadelphia 4, 6 (Sept. 2002); see also Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, 
and the Law:  The Interface of Medicine, Public Health, and the Law:  Governmental Responses to 
Pregnant Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, 8 DePaul J. Health Care L. 461, 477 (2005) 
(hereinafter Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law).  
4 Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body OR Unshackling Black Motherhood, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 938, 
939 (1997), Laura Gomez, Misconceiving Motherhood: Legislators, Prosecutors and the Politics of Prenatal 
Drug Exposure 118 (1997).   
5 Id.  See also Women’s Law Project, supra, and Lynn R. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, supra.   It is 
notable that domestic violence rises in connection with pregnancy.  Homicide accounts for more than 11% 
of all deaths of pregnant women.  Antonia Zerbisias, Killings Reopen Debate on Rights of Fetuses, Toronto 
Star, Oct. 10, 2007.  Homicide is the second most common cause of death for pregnant women, following 
only behind auto accidents, but ahead of the death rate for any single pregnancy-related condition.  Id., 
Lynn Moriarty, Valley Voice:  Pregnant Women Face Increased Violence, Desert Sun (Palm Springs, CA), 
June 28, 2007, at 6B.   
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adequate health care for women and children.  Third, I will examine the laws of two other 
nations, Canada and France, for purposes of comparative legal, cultural, and economic 
analysis.  I will offer some informed speculation about the reasons why the American 
obsession with “fetal protection” is not matched by other nations.  Here I will address four 
factors:  America’s considerable reliance on constitutional litigation as a means of achieving 
law change, America’s federal system of government, which provides more opportunities for 
different legal rules to operate concurrently within the same nation, the United States’ unique 
system of locally elected prosecutors, and the lack of a system of government-funded 
universal health care.  Finally, I will suggest ways in which American law could be reformed 
to embrace the unity of interests of pregnant women and their fetuses and promote the 
health of both, by providing treatment, not punishment, for addicted women. 
 
I.      Two Decades of Prosecuting Pregnant American Women 
 A.  The Risks of Maternal Drug Use 
A focus on maternal behavior as the guarantor of successful childrearing is not new. 
Ever since Jean Jacques Roseau penned Emile, mothers have been seen as essential to 
creating healthy citizens and ensuring social harmony.6  In the 1950s, American women were 
supposed to be at home full time to nurture their children.  Since the late 1980s, American 
prosecutors, physicians, public health officials, and media have focused on the potential for 
children to be harmed by their mother’s drug use (including alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, and 
                                                          
6 In Emile, Jean Jacques Rousseau urged French women to take up their duties to breastfeed their infants.  
He wrote:  “Do you want to bring everyone back to his first duties?  Begin with mothers. …The whole 
moral order degenerates; naturalness is extinguished in all hearts [when wet nurses, and not their mothers, 
nourish infants]….Let women once again become mothers, men will soon become husbands and fathers 
again.” Emile (or On Education), trans, A. Bloom  (1979)), cited by Rebecca Kukla, Mass Hysteria:  
Medicine, Culture, and Mothers’ Bodies 30-35 (2005) (arguing that Rousseau’s vision of  “the maternal 
body” played a central role in Enlightenment thinking, and still influences modern views of the role of 
mother in society). 
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other drugs) while pregnant. Approximately 5-6% of American women use illegal drugs 
during pregnancy, while 25% use alcohol.7  Drug use is common across all ethnic groups 
and classes; although black women are ten times more likely to have their drug use reported 
to prosecutors or child welfare authorities.8 Most scientists agree that drug use, broadly 
defined, during pregnancy can harm the newborn, but they disagree about both the severity 
and the permanence of the harm.9   
                                                          
The dangers of in utero alcohol exposure are well demonstrated, although it was not 
until the 1970s that the causal relationship between maternal alcohol use, fetal harm, and 
mental retardation became clear.10   Even infants born to mothers who drink moderately 
while pregnant may experience deficits in IQ, learning, and attention,11 but the debate 
continues about whether minimal alcohol consumption during pregnancy is dangerous.   
It is less clear whether, and to what extent, other drugs affect fetal development. 
Some researchers have determined that maternal cocaine use may lead to subtle, long-lasting 
neurological deficits, including “the ability to habituate or self-regulate” and small deficits in 
IQ and language ability,12 but others have found that most infants exposed in utero to 
cocaine “catch up to their peers in physical size and health status by age 2.”13   
7 Addiction Medicine:  Psychopathology of Pregnant Women with Alcohol and Drug Dependencies 
Examined, Women’s Health Weekly, Aug. 23, 2001, at 8 (hereinafter Addiction Medicine). 
8 Ira Chasnoff,   The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in 
Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1206 (1990) (observing 
that black women were ten times as likely as white women to be reported by their physicians for using 
drugs, despite equal rates of drug use). 
9 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, States Responses to Maternal Drug and Alcohol Use: 
An Update (2000), available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/forum/maternalabuse.htm, and Janet R. 
Hankin, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome Prevention Research, National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism’s Alcohol Research and Health (August 2002). 
10 Addiction Medicine, supra n. [7].  
11 Steven J. Onderama, Sharon M. Simpson, Elizabeth V. Brestan, Martin Ward, Prenatal Drug Exposure 
and Social Policy: The Search for an Appropriate Response, 5 (No. 2) Child Maltreatment 93, 95-97 
(2000) (hereinafter Prenatal Drug Exposure).Prenatal Drug Exposure supra, at 95-97.   
12 Id. 
13 National Conference of State Legislatures, States Responses to Maternal Drug and Alcohol Use: An 
Update (2000), supra n. [ 9 ]. 
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Methamphetamine is the illegal drug de jour, which is affecting communities across 
the United States.  It is portrayed by law enforcement and the media as posing a risk of 
serious fetal harm; however, there is scant data demonstrating a causal relationship between 
exposure to methamphetamine in utero and problems of infant development.14   
Even legal drugs are now coming under heightened public scrutiny. Tobacco use 
during pregnancy poses risks similar in kind to those of cocaine, although the risks are of 
lower magnitude.  Of course, many more women smoke while pregnant than use cocaine.15   
Caffeine, a widely used drug, has recently received substantial media attention, although the 
evidence of its harmful effects is quite limited and sharply contested.16   
Recent research stresses the multiple determinants of poor birth outcomes, with 
important factors including maternal poverty, poor nutrition, homelessness, a history of 
domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care.17  Because it is difficult to untangle the complex 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Dana Stone, supra n. 1.  Media stories abound concerning the risks of in utero methamphet-
amine exposure for the long-term development of children.  See, e.g., Katie Zernike, A Drug Scourge 
Creates its Own Form of Orphan, N.Y. Times July 11, 2005, at A1; U.S. Warns of ‘Global Meth Threat,’ 
available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news/bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/475719.s 
(5/14/2006).  Others have criticized this media coverage as sensational and poorly informed. See, e.g., 
Daniel Thigpen, Case of Lodi Baby Raises Difficult Legal Dilemma, The Record (Stockton, CA), Oct. 14, 
2007 (discussing a lack of medical data showing that methamphetamine causes developmental problems in 
children), and  Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialist Warn Mass Media on “Meth Baby” 
Stories, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtml (July 29, 2005); see also 
Ryan S. King, The Next Big Thing? Methamphetamine in the United States 16-28 (The Sentencing Project 
June 2006) (asserting that the media have failed utterly to accurately report the science and epidemiological 
data surrounding methamphetamine addiction), and Canadian Broadcasting System (CBC) News, Newborn 
Hair Signals Expectant Mothers’ Meth Use: Study, CBC News, Oct. 31, 2006 (noting the difficulty in 
determining whether a newborn’s low birthweight should be attributed to its mother’s use of stimulants like 
methamphetamine and cocaine while pregnant or due to her poor nutrition and lack of “self-care” because 
of drug use.  
15 N. Kistin, A. Handler, F. Davis, and C. Ferre, Cocaine and Cigarettes: a Comparison of Risks, 10 (3) 
Paediatric Perinatal Epidemiology 269 (1996) (noting that while children exposed to cocaine in utero were 
more likely to have adverse birth outcomes than children whose pregnant mothers consumed no drugs, 
children whose mothers used tobacco products while pregnant were at risk for the same adverse outcomes 
as children whose mothers used cocaine, although the magnitude of the risk was lower.   
16 In January 2008 a report suggesting a link between caffeine intake and miscarriages received wide public 
attention, despite the statements of some scientists that the link might not be causal.  See, e.g., Denise 
Grady, Pregnancy Problems Tied to Caffeine:  Long-Held Concerns about Miscarriages Are Focus of New 
Study, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2008, p A10.   
17 Because many women who use illegal drugs also abuse alcohol, there is a need for comprehensive and 
intensive drug treatment programs that take into account the complex needs of this population, which has 
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causal relationships between maternal drug use and other contributors to poor birth 
outcomes, it is short-sighted to focus solely on drugs as the source of fetal and childhood 
harm.   
An intriguing and often overlooked issue is the risk of harm accompanying the use 
of assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.).  Twins and other multiple births are far more 
likely than “singletons” to be born earlier and smaller, and they are at risk for other 
neurological and developmental problems as well.18 One out of eight American children is 
born premature and low-birthweight, with the rate of pre-term births rising 30% since 
1981.19  A large percentage of these children are the product of A.R.T.  Few commentators 
have suggested that the mothers who use A.R.T. should be criminalized or otherwise 
compelled to change their behavior to reduce the possibility of harm to their offspring.20  
Women (and their spouses and partners) who use A.R.T. are permitted complete choice in 
terms of the particular technology they use, as well as whether they will have multiple 
                                                                                                                                                                             
high “[r]ates of homelessness, poverty, unemployment, and prostitution … [and] histories of emotional, 
physical, and sexual abuse.” Addiction Medicine, supra n. [7]. See also Steven J. Onderama, Sharon M. 
Simpson, Elizabeth V. Brestan, Martin Ward, Prenatal Drug Exposure, supra, and Deborah A. Frank et al., 
Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285 
JAMA 1613, 1619 (2001).    
18 Id., see also Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the 
Law Protect Them From Harm?, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 57, 60, 62-66, 69-70, 77-80 (2004) (summarizing data 
showing that up to 10% of children born using ART suffer some adverse consequences).   
19 Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, July 13, 2006 
(hereinafter IOM Report on Preterm Birth), available at 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11622. The Report defines 
“preterm” as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a full-term pregnancy is 38-42 
weeks post-conception).   
20See, e.g., Tarun Jain, Stacey A, Missmer, and Mark D. Hornstein, Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice 
and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States, (noting the adverse 
results of the high multiple birth rate in the Unites States, but observing that the United States has not 
regulated ART practices “in part because of the basic belief that such decisions should be left to couples 
and their physicians”); but see Rosato, supra (criticizing the regulatory hands-off position of states and the 
federal government).  [add Dorothy Roberts] 
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fertilized eggs implanted and/or engage in selective embryo reduction to reduce the chances 
of multiple births.21 
 
B.  The First Wave of Criminal Prosecutions  
In the last two decades, more than a hundred women in the United States have been 
criminally prosecuted for causing harm to their fetuses by using drugs while pregnant.22  In 
the late l980s and early 1990s, as public attention focused on an epidemic of crack cocaine 
use (which disproportionately affected racial minorities and the poor) many women were 
convicted of crimes such as delivering drugs to a minor or child abuse.  In every state but 
South Carolina, these convictions were ultimately overturned by state appellate courts.  In 
invalidating these prosecutions, judges first cited the principle of legality to hold that a fetus 
was not a child or that drugs could not be “delivered” to a minor via the umbilical cord, and 
emphasized the separation of powers problem inherent in having judges and prosecutors 
create law going beyond that enacted by the legislature.23  Many judges also expressed 
concern that criminalizing women’s conduct beyond that already encompassed by the crimes 
of drug use or possession would only drive addicted women underground, away from 
medical help.24 Some legislatures, like Missouri’s, concluded that the problem of pregnant 
                                                          
21 Clinics Try to Lower the Odds of Multiple Births, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2008  at F1 and F6. The high 
cost of fertility treatment often influences women’s decisions to risk multiple births, and “many people just 
see the adorable twins cooing in … double strollers…,” ignoring the 15% of low birthweight infants who 
do not survive.  Id. 
22 See cases noted in n. [  ], supra. 
23 In Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld a 
conviction under the child endangerment statute for drug use during pregnancy, declaring that a viable fetus 
was a "child" under the statute. 
24 See, e.g., Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).  Medical and public heath groups also 
assert that such prosecutions will simply drive a wedge between pregnant women and their physicians, and 
render it less, not more, likely that the women will seek appropriate pre-and post-natal care, including 
substance abuse treatment. Accord, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (observing that “an 
intrusion on …[a patient’s expectation of privacy in regard to diagnostic medical tests] may have adverse 
consequences because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care.” Id. at 78, n. 14, and 82-
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women’s drug use could be most effectively addressed by making more drug treatment 
resources available, and explicitly precluded the criminal prosecution of women for harm to 
their children allegedly caused by prenatal drug exposure.25    
 
C. The Current Wave of Prosecutions 
      1. Homicide Prosecutions 
However, in the late 1990s, prosecutors in six states began much more aggressive 
prosecutions against pregnant women, for the first tune seeking to convict them of acts of 
criminal homicide, including murder, manslaughter, and attempted intentional homicide.  In 
these and other states, prosecutors have also indicted women for crimes such as child abuse 
and drug delivery, even though these prosecutions had been declared to be legally unsound 
previously, either in those states or in other jurisdictions.  In many recent cases, prosecutors 
have been assisted by nurses and doctors.   
In 1996, Wisconsin prosecutors charged a young woman, Deborah J.Z., with 
attempted first-degree intentional homicide26 and first-degree reckless injury,27 based on her 
comments, made following going into labor at a bar, that she would drink herself and her 
fetus to death.28  The Wisconsin Supreme Court condemned the woman’s behavior but 
                                                                                                                                                                             
85).  In a separate article, I will explore at greater length the anti-deterrent impact of criminal prosecutions 
on women seeking prenatal care and substance abuse treatment. 
25 State v. Wade, 232 S.W.3d. 663, at 666 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), discussing, inter alia, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
1.205, which provides, simultaneously that “human life begins at conception” and that “[n]othing in this 
section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn 
child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.” 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 (1) and (4), respectively. 
26 At the time, Wisc Stat. 940.01, first-degree intentional homicide, provided that:  “(a) … whoever causes 
the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony.” 
(emphasis added). 
27 At the time, Wisc. Stat. § 940.23, “Reckless injury,”  provided that:  “(a) Whoever recklessly causes 
great bodily harm to another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life 
is guilty of a Class D felony.” 
28Deborah J.Z. “’allegedly told a nurse that ‘if you don’t keep me here, I’m just going to go home and keep 
drinking and drink myself to death and I’m going to kill this thing because I don’t want it anyways.’” 
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barred the criminal prosecution.  Relying on the principle of legality, the court ruled that 
under Wisconsin’s “born alive” rule, a fetus was not a human being,29 and thus the 
attempted homicide statute did not apply.  The court identified several problems with the 
prosecution.  The court first asked whether the problem of substance abuse was better 
addressed through treatment or punishment, noting the concern that threatening criminal 
prosecution could deter women from seeking prenatal care or treatment for substance 
abuse.30  In addition, the court recognized the significant slippery slope problem created by 
the prosecution of pregnant women:  since there is an extended continuum of maternal 
behavior which potentially risks harm to the fetus, where on that continuum should the line 
justifying criminal prosecution be drawn?  The court observed that to permit the prosecution 
to go forward in this case would mean that “a woman could risk criminal charges for any 
perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may result in injuries to her 
unborn child [, including] smoking or abusing legal medications…. [or] ‘the failure to secure 
adequate prenatal medical care and overzealous behavior, such as excessive exercising or 
dieting.’”31 
In South Carolina, by contrast, prosecutors have engaged in an ever more strident 
campaign against pregnant women, with conviction and harsh sentences imposed in many 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Deborah J.Z. also expressed fear about the pain of giving birth and the baby’s race.  State v. Deborah J.Z., 
596 N.W.2d 490, 491(Wis. 1999). The child was born with a blood alcohol level of .199 and physical 
features showing fetal alcohol effects.  Id.  
29 Id. at 496. Wisconsin law defined a “human being” as “one who has been born alive.” Wisc. Stat. s. 
939.22 (16).  The court explained its decision as required by the rule of strict construction of penal laws and 
by deference to the legislature in a complex public policy area.  Id. at 494-95. 
30 596 N.W.2d at 495.  The court’s concern is supported by a study of low-income women who delivered 
their babies at an inner city hospital in Detroit.  The women stated their belief that if Michigan adopted a 
law mandating that women whose babies tested positive for drugs would be sent to jail, substance-abusing 
women would be less likely to seek prenatal care, drug testing, or drug treatment.  When the study’s 
authors attempted to interview women in a state with a law that threatened incarceration, all known drug 
users refused to participate in the study out of fear of self-incrimination.   Marilyn L. Poland, Mitchell P. 
Drombrowski, Joel W. Ager, and Robert J. Sokol, Punishing Pregnant Drug Users: Enhancing the Flight 
from Care, 31 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 199, 201-02 (1993). 
31 Id., citing Hillman v. Georgia, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). 
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cases.  During the 1990s, nurses at Charleston’s main public hospital joined with prosecutors 
to create a clandestine program to test the infants born to women suspected of drug use. 
The United States Supreme Court struck down the program as violating the women’s Fourth 
Amendment rights in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.32     
In 1999, Regina McKnight became the first American woman to be charged with 
murder33 after her child was stillborn.  McKnight was a homeless African-American woman 
with an IQ of 72 who was addicted to crack cocaine.34  After she went into premature labor, 
her child was stillborn.  McKnight and her child were tested for drugs and cocaine 
metabolites were found in both their systems.35  Although her first trial ended in a mistrial 
largely because of the weakness of the prosecution’s case on causation, in the second trial 
McKnight was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.36  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court upheld the conviction, rejecting defendant’s argument that a homicide 
prosecution violated the due process principle of legality.  The court failed to address the 
essence of her contention - that her actions could not constitute homicide without an 
express legislative declaration that a fetus could be considered a child for purposes of the 
penal law.  Instead, the court cited its prior decisions upholding women’s convictions for 
felony child abuse based on their drug use while pregnant, saying that these decisions 
provided ample notice to meet due process concerns.37  The court also rejected McKnight’s 
                                                          
32 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (rejecting an asserted “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment). 
33 State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003).  The actual charge against McKnight was “homicide by 
child abuse,” a statutory enactment of the felony-murder rule.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-85 provides that this 
offense is committed if one “causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child 
abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human 
life.” 
34 Robyn E. Blummer, Moralists’ New Target: Pregnant Women, St. Petersburg (Florida) Times, Aug. 10, 
2003, p. 7D.   
35 State v. McKnight, 576 S.E. 2d 168 171, 173.  
36 The court suspended the sentence upon service of twelve years in prison.  State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 
168, 171 (S.C. 2003). 
37 Id. at 175-76, citing Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). The court also rejected Ms. 
McKnight’s argument McKnight’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to establish either 
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constitutional arguments based on her right to privacy and her Eighth Amendment 
proportionality argument. 38   
Prosecutors have also brought homicide charges in Hawaii, Missouri, Oklahoma, and 
Utah. In 2003 a Hawaii prosecutor charged Tayshea Aiwohi with manslaughter based on her 
methamphetamine use while pregnant, which allegedly caused the death of her infant two 
days after birth.39  The indictment was not brought for two years, after Ms. Aiwohi had 
successfully completed a drug treatment program.  The prosecutor and the trial judge 
asserted that criminal charges were necessary to hold her accountable and to send a message 
to prevent other mothers from using drugs while pregnant.40  After conviction, Ms. Aiwohi 
received a twenty year prison sentence, which was suspended on condition that she comply 
                                                                                                                                                                             
causation or the necessary mens rea of “extreme indifference to the value of human life.  It found that the 
mens rea was met by its precedents upholding felony child abuse convictions for maternal drug use while 
pregnant, declaring that both she and other women in South Carolina were thus on notice that the use of 
cocaine while pregnant causes fetal harm.  The court also found sufficient evidence to send the case to the 
jury on the causation question, despite evidence that in approximately 40% of stillbirths it is impossible to 
make a medical judgment about the cause of death. Id. at 172-73. 
38 McKnight asserted that a twenty year prison term for the stillbirth of a child was disproportionate, given 
that the maximum sentence for a woman who procures an abortion in South Carolina is two years and the 
crime is a misdemeanor.  S.C. Code Ann. § 44-41-80 (b) (2002). The court compared McKnight’s sentence 
to the sentence received by other convicted murderers in South Carolina, and murderers of children in other 
states. Id. at 177. The court declined to consider the applicability of the abortion statute was applicable, 
saying that she had not preserved the issue for appellate review.  Id. at 174. 
39 Decision in State v. Aiwohi, by Circuit Judge Michael Town, Aug. 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page_server/LegalReferences/73DFB8859867A628EAE7AB3DC5.html. 
40Id., denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, According to the prosecutor, the indictment was a 
necessary “’wake-up call,’” so that “’we will never see a case like this again.’” Ken Kobayashi, Mother 
Gets Probation in Ice Death, Honolulu Advertiser, Aug. 26, 2004, p.1B.  The trial judge concurred, ruling 
that “the State, with good reason, has served clear notice that such conduct can and will result in serious 
felony charges brought where the child is born alive and later dies or suffers injury due to knowing, 
intentional or reckless drug use.”  The judge rejected any suggestion that Aiwohi’s addiction could be a 
mitigating factor, declaring that, [D]rug usage, including the use of crystal methamphetamine is a matter of 
choice and not an illness.  Certainly it is a conscious choice to obtain and use the drug initially and worse 
yet, while pregnant.”  Opinion available at http://www.courts.state.hi.us/page_server/ LegalReferences/ 
73DFB8859867A628EAE7AB3DC.html.  
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with the terms of probation for the next ten years.41  On appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction on legality grounds.42  
Yet even after the convictions of McKnight and Aiwohi, many observers were stunned 
by the 2004 decision of Utah prosecutors to charge Melissa Rowland for capital murder 
based on her decision to decline a recommended caesarian section (C-section) and the 
stillbirth of her son.  Like Ms. McKnight, Ms. Rowland was a vulnerable woman without an 
adequate support system.  Her own mother died soon after she was born, and Ms. Rowland 
had a long history of serious mental illness and substance abuse.43  When she became 
pregnant with twins, she decided to give up the infants for adoption.   She moved to Utah 
when the adoption agency told her that Utah’s less demanding adoption laws made the 
process easier.  While awaiting delivery, Ms. Rowland lived on disability payments and a $100 
weekly stipend from the adoption agency and used cocaine and tobacco.44  When she could 
not feel fetal movements Ms. Rowland sought help at three hospitals, but she rejected the 
hospitals’ advice to have a C-section.45  After Ms. Rowland delivered a stillborn son and a 
living daughter, she was charged with murder.  Prosecutors predicated their case on a theory 
of maternal “selfishness,” asserting that Rowland’s decision not to have a C-section 
demonstrated the “depraved indifference to human life” necessary for murder.46  The 
                                                          
41 Id.  
42The Court held, in a rather technical opinion, that the attendant circumstance that the victim be a person at 
the time of the defendant’s conduct was an essential element of manslaughter, and thus her conviction 
could not stand State v. Aiwohi, 109 Haw. 115, 128, 123 P. 3d 1210, 1223 (Haw. 2005). 
43 Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, Rowland’s Out of Jail, Heading to Indiana, Deseret Morning News (Salt 
Lake City, Utah), Apr. 30, 2004. 
44 Katha Pollitt, Pregnant and Dangerous….,” 278 (#16) The Nation 9 (Apr. 26, 2004). 
45 Prosecutors charged that she refused to have a Caesarian section because of “cosmetic concerns” that the 
operation would disfigure her, but Rowland stated that she never would have said that because she had 
already delivered two children by C-section.  Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, supra n. [42]; see also 
Pamela Manson, Mother is Charged in Stillborn Son’s Death..., Salt Lake Tribune Mar. 12, 2004. 
46 Linda Thomson, Rowland Case Is Called ‘Political,’ Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah) 
March 13, 2004.  
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prosecutors argued that Ms. Rowland had refused the surgery because of vanity,47 and 
alleged, contrary to well-established principles of informed consent,48 that Ms. Rowland did 
not have a right to decline medical treatment.49  After three months in jail, Rowland entered 
into a plea agreement by which she pleaded guilty to two counts of felony child 
endangerment. 50  
Since the Rowland prosecution, at least five other women have been charged with 
homicide based on their drug use while pregnant when the child died or was stillborn.   
These include Jennifer Arrowood,51 Jamie Lee Burroughs,52 and Lorraine Patrick53 in South 
Carolina, Theresa Hernandez in Oklahoma,54 and Sheri Lohnstein in Missouri.55    
 
                                                          
47 Associated Press, Caesarean Refusal Leads to Murder Charge,  
http: //www.CNN.com/2004/US/West/03/11/mother.charged.ap. (Mar 12, 2004). 
48 Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-5 codifies the common law of informed consent, although it presumes that 
“when a person submits to health care rendered by a health care provider … that what the health care 
provider did was expressly or impliedly authorized” by the patient. § 78-14-5(1). However, patients may 
still have a cause of action for battery without meeting the requirements of § 78-14-5 if they allege that they 
did not consent at all to medical treatment.  Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
49 Linda Thomson, Mother Is Charged in Stillbirth of a Twin, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, 
Utah) March 12, 2004. 
50 Ms. Rowland was sentenced to two concurrent five year prison terms, with sentence suspended while on 
“good behavior” probation for eighteen months, requiring her to complete mental health and substance 
abuse treatment as well as a “parenting skills” course. Jacob Santini, supra, Doug Smith and Linda 
Thomson, Rowland in New Trouble, Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City, Utah) May 27, 2004.   
51 In 2005 Ms. Arrowood was charged with homicide by child abuse.  In 2006 she pleaded guilty to 
unlawful neglect by a custodian and was sentenced to ten years in prison. This information was obtained 
through a national judicial website, available at:  http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/caseSearch/caseSearch.cfm   
Ms. Arrowood’s information was found at http://www.13th-judicial-
circuit.org/Central_Index_Details_Crim.asp?tb_Casenum=I675718&tb_CourtAgency=39001&tb_LastNam
e=Arrowood&tb_FirstName=Jennifer&tb_SeqNum=0&tb_County=39&tb_CourtType=G 
52 In 2006 Ms. Burroughs was charged with homicide by child abuse.  The case is still pending. Kelly 
Marshall Fuller, Test for Drugs Sends Woman Back to Jail, The Sun News (Myrtle Beach, S.C.) Apr. 24, 
2007. See information available at: 
http://secure.georgetowncountysc.org/publicindex/PICaseDetails.aspx?County=22+&Casenum=H750929&
CourtType=G&CaseType=Criminal&CourtAgency=22001&LastName=Burroughs&FirstName=Jamie 
53 Ms. Patrick was charged in October 2007 with homicide by child abuse.  Her case is still pending. See 
information available at: http://www.lex-
co.com/applications/scjdweb/publicindex/PICaseDetails.aspx?County=32+&Casenum=J820080&CourtTy
pe=G&CaseType=Criminal&CourtAgency=32001&LastName=Patrick&FirstName=Lorraine. 
54 See sources cited in note 1, supra. 
55 Tim Bryant, Mother Can’t Be Prosecuted in Baby’s Death, Lawyer Argues, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 
16, 2007, p. B1; Kelly Wiese, Missouri Lawmakers Offer Bills on Courts, Taxes, Alcohol for ’08, Kansas 
City (MO) Daily Record, Dec. 4, 2007.  
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2. New Child Abuse and Child Endangerment Prosecutions  
 While prosecutors in some states were pursuing homicide charges, prosecutors in 
other states, notably Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Wyoming, were bringing child abuse and child endangerment charges against women who 
used drugs while pregnant, invoking legal theories discredited more than a decade earlier.   
In all cases, the charges were dismissed or the convictions were overturned.  In 2003, 
a Missouri prosecutor charged Keila Lewis with first degree felony child endangerment, 
based on her newborn baby’s positive test for marijuana and Lewis’ admission that she 
smoked marijuana once while pregnant.56  The case was dismissed because the relevant 
toxicology results were ruled inadmissible.57  In 2005, also in Missouri, Janet Wade was also 
prosecuted for felony child endangerment, based on her use of marijuana and 
methamphetamine while pregnant. The state Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s 
decision to dismiss the charges, holding that while the Missouri legislature recognized that 
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being," it had 
determined to advance those interests in a non-criminal manner.58  Under this legislative 
scheme, pregnant women were to be given first priority in drug treatment programs and 
social services were authorized to investigate whether a newborn child was at risk from its 
mother’s drug use; at the same time, criminal charges and civil causes of action were 
precluded by statute.59   
In 2003, relying on a newly enacted Texas law, a Texas prosecutor brought a series of 
indictments, charging eighteen women with child abuse and two others with delivery of a 
                                                          
56Missouri Brief of Amici Curiae in State v. Lewis, Case 03CR113048, Chariton County, Missouri Circuit 
Ct.   
57 Personal Communication from Professor Jane Aiken, Washington University School of Law, and Jenean 
Thompson, counsel for Keila Lewis.   
58 232 S.W.3d 663, 665-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007), citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 (2).   
59 232 S.W.3d 663, 665-66. 
 17
controlled substance to a minor.60  The prosecutor asked local physicians to report women 
they suspected of drug use, and many complied.61 In 2006, the Texas Court of Appeals 
reversed the convictions of Tracy Ward and Rhonda Smith for drug delivery, holding that 
the prosecution had not established the fact of drug delivery beyond a reasonable doubt and 
that under the principle of legality, it could not expand the meaning of “deliver” beyond 
legislative authorization.62  
In 2004, a Wyoming prosecutor charged Michelle Foust with causing a child to 
ingest methamphetamine. A judge dismissed the indictment, ruling that a fetus was not a 
child under the law.63  In 2004 and 2005, a Maryland prosecutor charged two women, Regina 
Kilmon and Kelly Cruz, with reckless endangerment based on their use of cocaine while 
pregnant.  Their convictions were reversed in 2006 by the Maryland Court of Appeals, with 
the court concluding that the Maryland legislature had not made this conduct criminal.64   A 
similar result was reached in New Mexico, where in 2003 Cynthia Martinez was convicted of 
felony child abuse based on her use of drugs and alcohol while pregnant.  In 2006 the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals reversed her conviction, holding that the New Mexico legislature 
                                                          
60 The new Texas law, Senate Bill 319, Act of May 31, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 822, 2003 Tex. Gen Laws 
2607, redefined the term “individual” in certain statutes to mean “a human being who is alive, including an 
unborn child at very stage of gestation from fertilization until birth.”  The law also redefined death to 
“include… for an individual who is an unborn child, the failure to be born alive.” Tex. Atty. Gen. Opinion 
No. GA-0291 (January 5, 2005).  The prosecutor charged at least eighteen women with crimes before the 
Texas Attorney General issued an Opinion concluding that the new law neither authorized prosecution for 
maternal drug use under the Controlled Substances Act nor required physicians to report such drug use. 
News from Lynn Paltrow, Executive Director of National Advocates for Pregnant Women, 
http://realcostofprisons.org/blog/archives/2005/01/news_from_lynn.html.  
61 September 22, 2003 Letter from Rebecca King, 47th District Attorney, available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinons/reqiests_ga/RQ0250GA.pdf. 
62 Ward v. State, 188 S.W.3d 874, 876 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006) and Rhonda Tulane Smith v. State, 
2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2370 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006), an unpublished opinion.  In Ward the court 
declared, “We are a judicial body obligated to enforce the law as written by the legislature.  If that body 
cares to define “deliver” as including the transfer of drugs by a mother to her unborn child through the 
exchange of bodily fluids, it may do so.  Yet, ours is not to write where it has not.”  Id.  
63 Judge Drops ‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005; AP Alert, Woman 
Charged with Using Meth While Pregnant Arrested Again, AP  May 2, 2005. 
64 Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306 (Md. Ct. App. 2006).    
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had not intended a “fetus” to be a “child” within the meaning of the child abuse statute.65 In 
2006, Griseliz Fernandez was charged by a New Hampshire prosecutor with reckless 
conduct and endangering the welfare of a child after she delivered an infant with traces of 
cocaine in its blood.66   These charges were dropped when Ms. Fernandez pleaded guilty to 
other charges and agreed to enter a drug treatment program.67  
 
3. Summary Observations 
What can we conclude about the continuing, intensified prosecution of women for 
their drug and alcohol use while pregnant?  Although, with the exception of South Carolina, 
all of the indictments or convictions have eventually been declared impermissible or 
unjustified, prosecutors appear undaunted.  What are the reasons for their behavior?  It 
could be that these prosecutors are motivated simply by career ambitions, and this article will 
later consider some characteristics of the American prosecutorial system which may explain 
the difference between American prosecutors and their Canadian and French counterparts.  
It also appears that some prosecutors are legitimately concerned about in utero drug 
exposure,68 and hope to solve the problem by publicly pillorying the women involved.   In 
addition, the American federal system provides multiple opportunities for new legal 
                                                          
65 State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195 (N.M. App. 2006).   The New Mexico Supreme Court granted 
certiorari, 141 P.3d 1280 (2006), and then quashed it, 161 P.3d 260 (2007), making the Court of Appeals 
decision final.  
66 Fetal Drug Case in Nashua Expected to Set Precedent, The Union Leader (Manchester, N.H.), Aug 1, 
2006. 
67 Albert McKeon, County Drops Endangerment Case, The Telegraph (Nashua, N.H.), Dec 20, 2006. 
68 For example, the Wyoming prosecutor in the Foust case stated, “’We stuck our toe in the water on this 
thing….. People need to understand there’s a big hole in the law that needs to be filled.’”  Judge Drops 
‘Meth Baby’ Charge, Casper (Wyoming) Star-Tribune, Sept. 29, 2005. 
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approaches to be tried out in the “laboratory” of the states,69 where the maxim, “If at first 
you don’t success, try, try again” may govern. 
However, one need not be a cynic to ask whether prosecutors could be more 
effective if they lobbied for comprehensive solutions to address the root causes of much 
substance abuse, including domestic violence, mental illness, poverty, and lack of access to 
health care.  Most physicians and public health authorities agree that threatening drug-
abusing pregnant women with criminal prosecution, rather than providing them with social 
and economic support and effective drug rehabilitation, will drive women away from 
treatment, out of fear that they could lose their babies or be imprisoned.70   New research on 
the nature of addiction suggests that, like many other illnesses, substance abuse is caused by 
a confluence of genetic, biological, and environmental factors, and can neither be treated nor 
made to disappear simply by punishing those who suffer from substance abuse as 
criminals.71  
Further, medical authorities, courts, and feminists have asserted that taking a criminal 
justice approach to deal with drug-addicted pregnant women launches prosecutors on a 
slippery slope.  There is simply no principled way to limit prosecution to cases of illegal drug 
use.  Pregnant women who smoke or who do not follow physicians’ recommendations about 
having c-sections, eating properly, or exercising appropriately, could also be prosecuted 
                                                          
69See the oft-quoted statement of Justice Brandeis in dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, “It is one of 
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932). 
70 See, e.g., Martha A. Jessup et al, Extrinsic Barriers to Substance Abuse Treatment Among Pregnant Drug 
Dependent Women, 22 J. Drug Issues 285, 291-292, 296-299 (2003); Kirsten Scharnberg, Prosecutors 
Targeting Pregnant Drug Users; Some Fear Women Will Shun Treatment, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23, 
2003, at p. C1, Patrik Jonsson, South Carolina Tests the Bounds of a Fetus’s Rights, Christian Science 
Monitor, Jun. 28, 2001, at USA Section p. 1. See also Linda Thomson and Pat Reavy, Rowland’s Out of 
Jail, Heading to Indiana, supra n.[  ]; Matt Canham, Proposed Law Targets Pregnant Drug Users…, Salt 
Lake Tribune (Salt Lake City, Utah), Apr. 10, 2004. 
71 See, e.g., Jeneen Interlandi, What Addicts Need, Newsweek, Mar. 3, 2008 (summarizing research).   
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under the same theories of maternal harm used in current prosecutions.72  Finally, 
prosecutions of pregnant drug and alcohol abusers raise the ugly spectre of racism seen in 
the eugenics movement of the early twentieth century.  Not only are almost all women 
targeted in the fetal protection crusade poor and/or racial minorities,73 but the public 
reaction favoring such prosecutions is often characterized by undisguised antipathy to the 
women.  Public commentary includes eugenic responses remarkably similar to Justice 
Holmes’ infamous “three generations of imbeciles is enough”74 comment in Buck v. Bell.75    
 
 
II. How American Law Promotes the Fetus as a Separate Legal Entity 
The criminal prosecutions discussed above are only a small part of the fetal 
protection war waged over recent years.76  Civil suits, statutes, and regulatory initiatives have 
all sought to separate fetuses from the pregnant women whose bodies sustain them.  In 2002 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued regulations purporting to 
“clarify and expand” the definition of “child” contained in the statute authorizing the State 
                                                          
72 Associated Press, Arrest in C-Section Case Alarms Women’s Groups, The Holland [Michigan] Sentinel, 
available at http://hollandsentinel.com/stories/031904/new_031904069.shtml. 
73 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body OR Unshackling Black Motherhood, supra n. 10, at 
939, and Ira J. Chasnoff et. al., supra n.     , at 1206.  
74 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).  
75 See, e.g., the following blog entries responding to  a news story about a South Carolina woman who 
pleaded guilty to the crime of unlawful conduct by a legal custodian, and received a sentence of probation 
on condition that she agree to use birth control.  One blogger wrote, “I think the system should look more 
into sterilization of these mothers, then [sic] making them take birth control. WE NEED TO PROTECT 
THESE INNOCENT CHILDREN!!!!!”  Another observed, “As a nurse who has had to help the children 
after being born addicted to drugs or suffering the consequences of poor prenatal care because the breeder 
(mother is not appropriate in this case) was too high to notice that she was even pregnant. The suffering at 
birth and beyond (due to medical procedures that need to be preformed later in life due to many types of 
birth defects associated with drug use and poor prenatal care) is like continuous child abuse. I tend to think 
the law is not stiff enough. The taxpayers end up taking care of these children, who are more likely not able 
to reach their full potential in life because of the effects of what these women have done to themselves and 
the child before it is born.” Blog comments available at 
http://chronicle.augusta.com/stories/021907/met_117138.shtml#comments. 
76 For a fuller account of  the broader legal context in which this fetal protection campaign has been waged, 
see my article, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care 
for Women and Children, 84 Denver University Law Review 537 (2006). 
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Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).77  These regulations redefined “child,” from 
“an individual under 19 years of age”78 to “an individual under the age of 19 including the 
period from conception to birth.”79 This regulatory legerdemain was criticized as unnecessary, 
since Congress was already debating several bills that would permit illegal immigrant women 
who were pregnant, the ostensible target of this regulation, to be covered under Medicaid or 
SCHIP.80  It seems clear that the regulation’s real goal was to create a legal precedent for the 
principle that the law should treat fetuses as persons, with all rights that accompany that 
status.81  
                                                          
77 SCHIP is a complement to Medicaid, SCHIP was established in 1997 under Title XXI of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj, and gives states the opportunity to provide additional health 
insurance coverage to children whose parents are too “wealthy” to qualify for Medicaid.  Medicaid, which 
was enacted in 1965 and is authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 (v) et 
seq., provides health care insurance for the very poorest of American children; see also Barry R. Furrow, 
Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, and Robert L. Schwartz, The Law of 
Health Care Organization and Finance 418-21 (4th ed. 2001). Both Medicaid and SCHIP are federal/state 
partnerships, with the federal and state governments sharing in both the financing and administration of the 
two programs.  However, there are important differences.  Medicaid is an entitlement program, in which all 
eligible persons must receive the same benefits.  SCHIP gives states greater flexibility in choosing what 
services to provide. Barry F. Furrow et al., supra, at 418-21, 438-39. Until 2007, the Bush Administration 
routinely approved state requests to expand SCHIP to cover more children at higher income levels 
(Remarks of Joe Baker, Assistant to Gov. Eliot Spitzer, at New York City Bar Association Panel on New 
York Health Care, Feb. 7, 2008, New York, New York), but the Administration reversed course in the fall 
of 2007, and refused to approve New York State’s request to expand its SCHIP program to include children 
at 400% of the federal poverty level.  Congress and the White House have been at loggerheads ever since.  
Donna Smith, U.S. House Sustains Bush Veto of Health Bill, NY Times Jan 23, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/washington/politics-usa-congress-children.html?_r=2&sq.... 
78 § 2110 of SCHIP, 42 U.S.C. 1397jj (c) (1). 
79 42 C.F.R. § 457.10 (emphasis added).  
80 Cynthia Dailard, New SCHIP Prenatal Car Rule Advances Fetal Rights At Low-Income Women’s 
Expense, The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, Dec. 2002, at 3.  Among the bills pending were the 
Mothers and Newborns Health Insurance Act of 2002, S724 (107th Cong., 1st Sess.), the Start Healthy/Stay 
Healthy Act of 2001, S. 1016 (107th  Cong., 1st  Sess.) and H.R. 3729 (107th Cong., 2nd Sess.), and the 
Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001 (S.582) (107th Cong., 1st Sess.) and the Legal 
Immigrant Children’s Health Improvement Act of 2001 (H.R. 1143) (107th  Cong., 1st  Sess.), all of which 
proposed to amend Medicaid and SCHIP to permit states to offer health care to more infants and pregnant 
women, including immigrant women who were excluded from eligibility under the Personal Responsibility 
and work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§601 et seq. 
81 See Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program: 
Capable of Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 Am. U. J. Gender Soc Pol’y & Law. 137, 143 (2003).   
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Government lawyers have on occasion sought to civilly commit pregnant women, in 
order to impose “treatment” on the women and their fetuses,82 and have also pursued court 
orders mandating Caesarian sections.83  While the avowed goal of these actions is to ensure 
the birth of healthy children, most physicians believe that such interventions are 
unwarranted and counter-productive.84  More than thirty states permit civil commitment 
based on the use of alcohol and other drugs,85 and several state laws explicitly authorize such 
                                                          
82 These include the case of Angela M.W., State ex re. Angela M.W. v Kruzicki, 561 N.W. 2d 729 (Wis. 
1997), and Rebecca Corneau, a woman who belonged to a religious sect that did not practice Western 
medicine. Corneau was confined in a “secure hospital facility for pregnant prison inmates” by a 
Massachusetts juvenile court judge until she agreed to medical examination and treatment).  See Marilyn L. 
Miller, Note: Fetal Neglect and State Intervention: Preventing Another Attleboro Cult Baby Death, 8 
Cardozo Women’s L. J. 71, 71 (2001).   
83 See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr, Inc., 66 F. supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999) 
(dismissing women’s § 1983 civil rights action against a hospital  which obtained a court order overriding 
Ms. Pemberton’s refusal to have a c-section) and News…Husband to Challenge Court Order in Lawsuit 
over Wife’s Refusal of Caesarean Section, Penn. Law Weekly Jan. 26, 2004, at 9; New Questions about 
Childbirth Rights, AP, May 19, 2004, available at http://keyetv.com/health_story_140110423.html.  This 
article discussing the case of Amber Marlowe, who was the subject of an ex parte order to have a Caesarian 
section because her fetus weighed 11 pounds, despite her having delivered 6 very large children previously. 
84 See, e.g., American Medical Association, H-420.969, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, declaring 
that “Judicial intervention is inappropriate when a woman has made an informed refusal of a medical 
treatment designed to benefit her fetus” and specifically recognizing the need for rehabilitative treatment 
for pregnant substance abusers, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ apps/pf_new/ 
pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-420.969.HTM; American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology, Patient Choice in the Maternal-Fetal Relationship, in Ethics in Obstetrics and Gynecology 
(2d ed. 2004), available at http://www.acog.org/from_home/ publications/ ethics/ethics034.pdf (stating that 
“court-ordered intervention against the wishes of a pregnant woman is rarely if ever acceptable”); 
American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Fetal Therapy – Ethical Considerations (after 
discussing the range of medical interventions to promote fetal health and the legal-ethical issues involved, 
concluding that “Under no circumstances should a physician physically intervene [to insist on medical 
treatment] without the explicit consent of the pregnant woman without judicial review….”), 103 Pediatrics 
1061 (5 May 1999). 
85 Ala. Code. § 22-52-1.2 (2004), Alaska Stat. § 47.37.1990 (Michie 2004), Ark. Code Ann. § 20-64-815 
(Michie 2004), Cal. Wel & Inst Code §3050 (Deering 2005), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-1107 (2004), Conn. 
Gen. Stat. §17a-685 (2004), Del. Code Ann. Tit. 16,  §2212 (2005), D.C. Code Ann. §7-1303.04 (2004), 
Fla. Stat. Ch. 397.675 (2004), Ga. Code Ann §37-7-41 (2004), Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §334.60.2 (Michie 
2004), Idaho Code §66-329 (Michie 2004), Ind. Code Ann. §12-23-11-1 (Michie 2004), Iowa Code 
§125.75 (2003), Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-29b54 (2003), La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §28.54 (2004), Mass. Ann. Laws 
ch. 123 §35 (Law. Co-op, 2005), Miss. Code. Ann. §41-30-27 (2004), Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §71-919 
(Michie 2004), N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §135-C:127 (2004), N.M. Stat. Ann. §43-2-8 (2005), N.D. Cent. Code 
§ 12.1-04.1-22 (2003), R.I. Gen. Laws § 21-28.2-3 (2004), S.C. Code Ann § 44-52-50 (Law. Co-op. 2004), 
South Dakota, Tenn. Code Ann. §33-5-403 (2004), Texas Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034 (Vernon 
2004), Va. Code Ann §37.1-67.1 (Michie 2004), Wash. Rev. Code §70.96A.140 (2004), W. Va. Code Ann. 
§ 27-5-2 (Michie 2004), Wis. Stat. § 51.15 (2004), Wyo. Stat. Ann. §25-10-110 (Michie 2004). Minnesota, 
Oklahoma, and South Dakota have involuntary commitment laws specifically for pregnant women who use 
drugs. Minn. Stat. §626.5561 (2004) Okla. Stat. tit. 43A §5-41- (2004) S.D. Codified Laws § 34-20A-
70(Michie 2004). 
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actions against pregnant women.86  Most disturbingly, among the thirty-five American 
jurisdictions which authorize individuals to execute advance medical directives to govern 
their medical care if they become incompetent, two thirds of the jurisdictions suspend these 
directives if the patient is pregnant,87 denying pregnant women the right to self-
determination and advance planning available to all other adults. 
Fetal “guardians” are another recent legal innovation, ostensibly designed to protect 
the interests of the “unborn.”  In June 2003, the wife of a Florida prosecutor sought to be 
appointed guardian of the fetus of a mentally disabled patient who lived in a group home in 
order to prevent the woman from having an abortion.88 Although the Florida courts 
ultimately rejected the suit, the case became a cause celebre in Florida.  In Alabama, some 
trial judges have appointed lawyers to represent the “silent voice” of the fetus in cases in 
                                                          
86 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 48.01, 48.02, 48.067, 48.203, 48.205, permitting the civil commitment of pregnant 
girls and women, dubbed “The Cocaine Mom law.” See also Tom Kertscher, ‘Cocaine Mom’ Law Involved 
in Attempt to Detain Woman, Racine Case Thought to Be First Time Law is Used Without Other Crime, 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Nov. 5, 1999, p. 1. 
87 For an overview of this subject, see Amy Lynn Jerdee, Note, Breaking Through the Silence: Minnesota’s 
Pregnancy Presumption and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 971, 978 (2000) 
(hereinafter Minnesota’s Pregnancy Presumption).  Seventeen states provide statutory exceptions to their 
“living will” or health care proxy statutes which render advance directions automatically ineffective if the 
patient is pregnant. Id. at 978, n. 35. Another sixteen states render the living will or health care proxy 
inapplicable in a variety of circumstances, ranging from a possibility to a probability that the fetus will 
“develop to a live birth.”  Id. at n’s 36-44.  The Alaska statute cited in n. 37, Alaska Stat. 18.12.040, was 
repealed in 2004.   Minnesota gives a slight bow to women’s autonomy by establishing a rebuttable 
presumption that a pregnant woman would want health care to be provided if there is a “real possibility that 
the fetus could survive to the point of life birth,” even if “the withholding or withdrawal of such health care 
would be authorized were she not pregnant.”  Minn. Stat. § 145C.10 (g).  The presumption can be rebutted 
by an explicit statement to the contrary in the advance directive itself, or by clear and convincing evidence 
presented at a hearing.  Id.  While this law endeavors to strike a balance between the woman’s interest in 
autonomy and the provision of a living maternal body in which the fetus can continue to develop, it still 
enshrines a normative view of women – that any “reasonable” woman would choose to continue on life-
support if it meant that her fetus would survive until birth.    
88 This attempt was rejected by the Florida District Court of Appeal in In re: Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 
So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), which held that under the Florida guardianship statute, a guardian 
can be appointed only for a “person,” and that fetuses were not “persons” under Florida law. Id. at 538. 
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which minors seeking an abortion have invoked the judicial bypass procedure to avoid the 
requirement of parental consent to abortion.89  
In March 2004, Congress enacted the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (the UVVA 
or Act),90 which made it a crime to injure or cause the death of a fetus while committing 
another federal offense.91  While both supporters and opponents of the Act acknowledged 
the significant problem of violence against pregnant women,92 opponents objected to the 
Act’s solution.  Rather than focusing on the injury suffered by the pregnant woman herself 
and providing that a person who harms a pregnant woman who also injures or kills the fetus 
should receive an enhanced penalty for that harm,93 the UVVA makes this attack or injury a 
separate crime.  To do so, the UVVA defines “unborn child” broadly, as “a member of the 
species homo sapiens, at any stage of development….”94  Critics of the UVVA and similar state 
statutes contend that the law effectively erases the pregnant woman as an injured party.95   In 
                                                          
89 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 810 So. 2d. 786, 795 (Ala. 2001) and In re Anonymous, 889 S0.2d 525, 527 
(Ala. 2003) (Johnstone, J., dissenting). 
90 Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004).  
91 18 U.S.C. § 1841. The law enumerated a lengthy list of federal offenses, including drive-by shootings in 
connection with drug offenses (18 U.S.C. § 36), violence at international airports (18 U.S.C. § 37), and 
assault on a federal officer or employee (18 U.S.C. §§ 111), 18 U.S.C. §1841 (b) (1).   
92 H. Rep. No. 108-420, Part 1, at 4, n. 2, citing Victoria Frey, Examining Homicide's Contribution to 
Pregnancy-Associated Deaths, 285 JAMA 1510 (2001) (summarizing the various studies); Isabelle L. 
Horon and Diana Cheng, Enhanced Surveillance for Pregnancy-Associated Mortality--Maryland, 1993-
1998, 285 JAMA 1455 (2001); Linn H. Parsons and Margaret A. Harper, Violent Maternal Deaths in North 
Carolina, 94 Obstet. Gynecol. 990-993 (1999); Dannenberg, et al., Homicide and Other Injuries as Causes 
of Maternal Death in New York City, 1987 through 1991, 172 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 1557-1564 (1995); 
Fildes, et al., Trauma: The Leading Cause of Maternal Mortality, 32 J. Trauma 643-645 (1992). 
93 Senator Dianne Feinstein proposed an amendment to the Senate bill to accomplish this, which was 
defeated by a vote of 50-49, largely along party lines.  A similar amendment offered by Representative Zoe 
Lofgren was also defeated in the House of Representatives, by a 229-186 vote.  Edward Epstein, Bill to 
Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant of a Pregnant Woman Could be Charged with 
2 Separate Federal Offenses, S. F. Chron. March 26, 2004, at A1, see also H. Rep. No. 108-420, Part 1, at 
86. 
94  18 U.S.C. § 1841 (d), 10 U.S.C. § 919a (Article 119a) (d) (emphasis added).  Under the law, “the term 
unborn child means a child in utero, and the term “child in utero” or “child, who is in utero” means a 
member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.” 
95 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 Ind. L. J. 667, 694-97 
(2006). 
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addition, as with the SCHIP regulation, this language suggests that the statute’s real goal is to 
pave the way for sharply limiting access to abortion.96  
Recent proposals for changes in abortion law also emphasize fetal “personhood.”97  
These include laws requiring women seeking abortion to be told about fetal pain,98 to be 
informed of the need to prepare a fetal death certificate, or to be given the opportunity to 
view a sonogram or listen to the heartbeat of their fetus prior to deciding to have an 
abortion.99  Supporters of these statutes justify them as providing “informed consent,” but 
the statutes are unusual in mandating the substantive details of what patients contemplating 
a medical procedure must be told.  In contrast, most American informed consent100 law 
focuses on the process of ensuring full communication between patients and their health care 
providers rather than the content of the physician-patient dialogue,101 relying on the health 
                                                          
96 Senator Feinstein argued that the UVVA was a deliberate effort to undermine abortion rights, by 
“`set[ting]… the stage for a jurist to rule that a human being an any stage of development deserves …rights 
under the law’….,” Edward Epstein, Bill to Make Harming Fetus a Crime is Passed by Senate; Assailant of 
a Pregnant Woman Could be Charged with 2 Separate Federal Offenses, supra n. [86].  
97 This of course includes the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531, which redefined a 
medical procedure to make it more akin to birth, for example, by using such terms as “delivers a living 
fetus.”   The law was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  
98 See The Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S.51.S1, proposed by Senator Sam Brownback of 
Kansas, a fierce abortion opponent, and the Montana Unborn Child Pain Prevention Act, House Bill No. 
238.  
99 Federal and state funding of fetal imaging machinery has paved the way for these laws through grants 
given to organizations that promote “abstinence only” sex education. The so-called “pregnancy crisis 
centers” have been a major beneficiary of such grants.  Ziba Kashef, The Fetal Position - News: Federal 
and State Dollars Are Subsidizing a Boom in Antiabortion 'Crisis Pregnancy Centers,' (Jan./Feb.2003) 
(hereafter The Fetal Position, available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/news/outfront/2003/01/ma_218_01.html; see also The Abortion Access 
Project, Impeding the Right to Choose: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, and sources cited therein, available at 
www.abortionaccess.org., and the proposed Informed Choice Act, S.755.1S, which provides for additional 
funding for ultrasound equipment to be used to provide pregnant women with a visual image of the fetus.    
100 Informed consent doctrine has roots in both the common law tort of battery and in negligence.  It 
protects both a patient’s interest in choosing when to be touched (a battery is an unconsented touching and 
includes medical treatment which the patient did not agree to  (see, e.g., Schloendorff v. The Society of 
New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93-94 (N.Y. 1914) and in receiving medical treatment from a physician 
who has explained to the patient those risks and benefits of treatment that a reasonable patient would wish 
to know (see, e.g.,  Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781-82, 787-88 (D.C. Cir. 1972)    and N.Y. Pub. 
Health L. 
§ 2805-d).     
101 Some abortion statutes require that the pregnant woman be told certain details about the fetus, such as its 
gestational age and its potential to survive outside the womb, and be informed of the availability of medical 
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care professional to determine what information to convey to a particular patient based on 
her own individual needs.  Revealingly, these so-called informed consent laws are unique in 
that their focus is on the interests of a third party, the fetus to be aborted, as opposed to the 
patient herself.  
Fetal protection doctrine also has a place in American tort law, as every state permits 
an infant born alive to sue third parties for harm inflicted prenatally.  Only a handful of cases 
have considered whether infants should be permitted to sue their mothers for prenatal harm.  
The jurisdictions are evenly split on the subject, with three courts holding that women 
should not be subject to suit for alleged prenatal negligence,102 and three holding that such 
actions are necessary to compensate the child who has been injured.103  These cases are 
important because they frame the normative question of who is the reasonable pregnant 
woman, as well as the related question of who gets to decide what conduct is reasonable.   
Similarly, in the American workplace, efforts have been made to protect fetuses from 
harm.  Unfortunately, rather than ensuring safe conditions for all workers, for whom toxic 
exposures or other hazards could jeopardize the health of their future children, these efforts 
have focused almost exclusively on female employees.  In International Union, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls the Supreme Court invalidated such workplace “fetal protection” policies, declaring 
that they violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because they discriminated on the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
assistance for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, as well as options for child support and adoption, 
see, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. § 40:1299.35.6 and Tex. Health & Safety Code §§171.012 – 171.014, 171.016, and 
discussion of Pennsylvania’s informed consent requirement in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-877 (1992).  In addition, there are other areas of health care in 
which state laws mandate that patients (usually women) be told of alternative medical or surgical options. 
These include laws addressing hysterectomy, see, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1690; sterilization, see, 
e.g., Or. Rev. Stat. § 436.225; breast cancer, see, e.g., S.G. Nayfield, G.C. Bongiovanni, M.H. Alciati, R.A. 
Fisher, L. Bergner, Statutory requirements for disclosure of breast cancer treatment alternatives, 16 J. 
Nat’l Cancer Inst. 1202 (1994); and childhood vaccination, see, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 6-18-702.  Medical 
procedures that are less politically charged rarely have such “informed consent” requirements. 
102Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E. 2d 260 (Mass. 2004), Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1999), and Stallman v. Younger, 531 N.E. 2d 355 (Ill. 1988). 
103 National Casualty co. v. Northern Trust Bank of Florida, N.A., 807 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001), 
Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464 (N.H. 1992), and Grodin v. Grodin, 310 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).  
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basis of gender.104 However, many employers continue to have such policies, effectively 
opting to be sued for gender discrimination rather than facing damage suits for causing 
prenatal injury.105  Almost all fetal protection policies ignore or discount the effects of 
exposure to toxic substances on men, despite the scientific evidence that such exposure can 
harm the male reproductive system and, thus, the children who are born to exposed men.106  
 
The Need for Different Priorities to Protect Children 
If the government’s goal were actually to ensure that more children are born healthy 
and have the opportunity to stay that way, the United States would adopt radically different 
policies, offering systemic harm reduction rather than a focusing on a handful of poor, 
marginalized, and drug-addicted women.  American health care data demonstrate significant 
racial disparities in birth outcomes and other measures of children’s health, which reflect a 
crisis in access to health care access, including the lack of a primary care physician and the 
lack of health insurance.107  More than ten million American children have no health 
insurance at all,108 and the Bush Administration has recently announced a policy change that 
                                                          
104 International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
105 Elaine Draper, Reproductive Hazards and Fetal Exclusion Policies after Johnson Controls, 12 Stan. L.  
Pol’y Rev. 117, 121 (2001). 
106 See, e.g., the EPA’s decision to cancel the pesticide ethylene dibromide (EDB) because of its oncogenic 
and mutagenic risks, as well as reproductive risks to male workers, 48 Fed. Reg. 46234 (Oct. 11, 1983), see 
also 48 Fed. Reg. 45956 (Department of Labor document regarding EDB’s effects on male reproductive 
capacity), cf. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
107Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, supra; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality – United States, 
1995-2002, 54 (No. 22) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 553 (June 10, 2005) (noting significant 
racial disparities in infant mortality rates within and across states); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Jennifer Flome, and 
Peter Joski, The Distribution of Health Insurance Coverage Among Pregnant Women, 1999 (Emory 
University April 2001) (identifying disparities in health insurance coverage along racial, employment 
status, and income lines) (paper prepared for the March of Dimes, on file with the author). 
108 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Facts, Enrolling Uninsured Low-Income 
Children in Medicaid and SCHIP (March 2005) available at www.kff.org/kcmu.  In 2005, more than 12% 
of children under age 18 lacked health insurance for at least part of the previous year. Robin A. Cohen and 
Michael E. Martinez, Centers for Disease Control, Health Insurance Coverage: Estimates from the national 
Health Interview Survey, January – September 2005, 3 (Released Mar. 20, 2006). “Uninsured but 
Medicaid-eligible children are twice as likely as those enrolled in Medicaid to have an unmet medical need, 
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will make it very difficult for states to expand access to health care for poor children under 
the SCHIP program.109  One eighth of American infants are born prematurely or are low 
birthweight, costing an estimated $26 billion per year,110 and American infant mortality rates 
have risen in recent years.111   
Beyond improving access to quality health care, the government should concentrate 
on reducing environmental harms, including the risk to all children posed by such hazards as 
mercury in fish, endocrine disrupters, and lead from older buildings and manufacturing. 
Many species of fish pose risks to adults, children, and fetuses, primarily through exposure 
to mercury and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).112 Many widely-used pesticides are 
suspected endocrine disrupters, which affect both male and female reproductive systems and 
increase the chances of infertility and other reproductive harms. 113   Lead poses risks to male 
and female workers, as well as their children.  In men, lead exposure leads to lowered sperm 
counts, abnormal sperm shapes, altered sperm transfer, and altered hormone levels.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to have not seen a doctor, and to have substantial family out-of-pocket spending on health care.” Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Facts, Enrolling Uninsured Low-Income Children 
in Medicaid and SCHIP, supra. 
109 N.Y. Times Jan. 23, 2008. 
110 Press release, Institute of Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention, July 13, 
2006 (hereinafter IOM Report on Preterm Birth), available at 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11622. The Report defines 
“preterm” as any birth that occurs at less than 37 weeks of pregnancy (a full-term pregnancy is 38-42 
weeks post-conception) and notes that the rate of pre-term births has risen 30 % since 1981.   
111Centers for Disease Control, Racial/Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality- United States, 1995-2002, 54 
(22) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (June 10, 2005). 
112 Nick Fox, Taking Worry off the Plate, N.Y. Times Jan. 30, 2008, Page F5. “[A] panel convened by the 
National Academy of Sciences reported in 2000 that 60,000 children were born each year exposed to levels 
of methymercury—the main variety found in fish—that could cause neurological and learning problems.”  
Id.  “Children born to women exposed to high levels of methylmercury [the organic form of mercury found 
naturally in the environment] during or before pregnancy may face numerous health problems, including 
brain damage, mental retardation, blindness, and seizures.  Lower levels of methylmercury exposure in the 
womb have caused subtle but irreversible deficits in learning ability.” Jennifer Fisher Wilson, Balancing 
the Risks and Benefits of Fish Consumption, 141 Annals Int. Med. 977, 978 (2004).  PCBs are a probable 
carcinogen.  In addition, “[i]n children, PCB exposure in utero and from breast milk consumption has been 
linked with neurodevelopmental delays, impaired cognition, immune problems, and alterations in male 
reproductive organs.” Id. at 979. 
113 Washington State Department of Labor & Industries Safety & Health Assessment & Research for 
Prevention Program, Workplace Hazards to Reproduction and Development: A Resource for Workers, 
Employers, Health Care Providers, and Health & Safety Personnel 48-50, Technical Report Number 21-3-
1999 (Aug. 1999). 
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results can be sterility and infertility.  In women, lead can cause miscarriages, stillbirths, and 
infertility, as well as developmental disorders in children exposed in utero.114    
American law also fails to promote fetal and child health through mandated paid 
parenting leaves. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 115 requires employers 
of more than fifty workers to grant them up to twelve weeks a year of unpaid leave for the 
birth or adoption of a child, or for family illness, the law does not adequately respond to 
children’s need for parental attention soon after birth and when they are ill.  Almost half of 
American workers are not covered by FMLA116 and even among those who are, only a 
fraction avail themselves of its leave provisions, because they cannot afford not to work, 
thus perpetuating existing race and class disparities.117   No federal law mandates paid 
parental leave for the period connected with pregnancy, childbirth and the early stages of 
infancy,118 and California and Ohio are the only two states to mandate any form of paid 
parental leave.119  In contrast, many other developed nations either mandate or offer paid 
parenting leave for at least some portion of this critical stage of fetal and children’s health 
                                                          
114 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, The Effects of Workplace Hazards on Female 
Reproductive Health 2-3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/99-104.html.  Lead that workers bring 
home on their skin, hair, clothes, tool box or car can cause severe lead poisoning for everyone who comes 
into contact with it, and can result in neurobehavioral and growth effects in a fetus.  National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health, The Effects of Workplace Hazards on Male Reproductive Health, 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ malrepro.html.  
115 The Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), requires employers of more 
than fifty employees to permit employees to take an unpaid leave for their own illness or a family 
member’s birth, adoption, or illness.  Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993), codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 
1302, 1312, 1381-1385, 1401-1416, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381-6387, 29 U.S.C. §§2601, 2611-2619, 2631-2636, 
2651-2654.However, in contrast to almost all developed countries, the United States does not mandate paid 
leave. Kurt H. Decker, Family and Medical Leave in a Nutshell 9-14 (2000). 
116 Erin Gielow, Note: Equality in the Workplace: Why Family Leave Does Not Work, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1529, 1539 (2002) (hereinafter cited as Equality in the Workplace). 
117 Nancy E. Dowd, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Ten Years of Experience: Race, Gender, 
and Work/Family Policy, 15 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 219, 222-31 (2004) (hereinafter Ten Years of 
Experience). 
118 In April, 2006 Representative Caroline Maloney introduced HR 5148, the Federal Employees Paid 
Parental Leave Act.  The Act would ensure paid leave for 6 of the 12 weeks that federal employees are 
authorized to take parental leave.  
119 Cal. Unemp. Ins. Code § 3300 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.136 (providing that permanent 
government employees shall receive 70% of their salary for four of the six weeks in which they are 
authorized to take parental leave).   
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and development, 120 and many countries offer additional financial or child-care support to 
single parents, those who are most likely to need leave from work to care for a newborn or 
ill child and are simultaneously the least likely to be able to afford to do so.121  In summary, 
when compared to other developed nations, the narrow, fetus-centric approach of the 
United States is seriously out of step.  
 
III.    Other Nations’ Approach to Fetal Protection and Child Health 
B. Canada 
1. The Legal Framework Regarding Fetuses 
 Canada has taken a very different approach from that of the United States in regard 
to protecting fetuses from harm in utero.  To some extent, this difference may result from a 
greater reliance on British law, and the maintenance of the born-alive rule, stemming from 
the fact that Canada did not gain independence until 1867.122  However, the path of 
Canadian law on fetal protection may also reflect the unifying effects of a strong national 
Parliament and the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as the different system for selecting 
prosecutors in Canada.   
For the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court of Canada has espoused a consistent 
view of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her fetus, declaring that the 
maternal-fetal relationship is legally unique, as there is but one legal person, rather than two 
                                                          
120 Nancy E. Dowd, supra n. [], at 233-36 (summarizing European Union law, and comparing, inter alia, 
the approach of France, which mandates maternity leave and provides much more generous paid leaves to 
mothers than to fathers, and Sweden, which is gender-neutral in its paid parenting leave policies); see also 
Naomi S. Stern, The Challenges of Parental Leave Reforms for French and American Women:  A Call for a 
Revived Feminist-Social Theory, 28 Vt. L. Rev. 32, 324-25 (2004) (describing the French statutory 
scheme), and Erin Gielow, supra n. 113, at 1539. 
121 Erin Gielow, supra, at 1547. 
122 The Constitution Act [formerly known as the British North America Act], 1867. 
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persons with potentially adverse positions.123  The Court has observed, “[T]he law has always 
treated the mother and unborn child as one.  To sue a pregnant woman on behalf of her 
unborn fetus therefore posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical entity suing 
itself.”124  This position was first articulated in the criminal law arena, and has been followed 
by decisions in the areas of civil commitment, compelled medical treatment of pregnant 
women, and tort law. 
 
a. The Criminal Law   
The Canadian Parliament has codified the common law born-alive rule for criminal 
matters.125  In two important decisions, Canadian courts have applied this rule to hold that 
neither a pregnant woman nor a third party can be criminally liable for actions contributing 
to the injury or death of a fetus.126  In Regina v. Sullivan and Lemay,127 the Supreme Court of 
Canada held that two midwives who were negligent in their assistance at a home birth could 
not be convicted of “criminal negligence causing the death of a person.”128 The Court 
                                                          
123  Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), [1997] S.C.R. 925 ¶¶ 27-29; Dobson 
v. Dobson, [1999] 174 D.L.R. (4th) ¶1 (declaring that, “The relationship between a pregnant woman and 
her foetus is unique and innately recognized as one of great and special importance to society”).     
124 Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.),[1997] S.C.R. 925 ¶ 27. 
125 See discussion of the English genesis of this rule, supra.  Under the Canadian Criminal Code § 223: 
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely    
proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not 
 (a) it has breathed; 
 (b) it has an independent circulation; or 
 (c) the navel string is severed. … 
 (2) A person commits homicide when he causes injury to a child before or during its birth  
 as a result of which the child dies after becoming a human being. 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 223.  
126 This is very different than the position of most states and the federal government in the United States, 
which accept and promote a distinction between actions done to the fetus by a third party and the woman 
who carries it. See, e.g,, Cal. Penal Code § 187 (Deering 2008) and the federal Unborn Victims of Violence 
Act, Pub. L. 108-212, 118 Stat. 568 (2004). 
127 [1991]  S.C.R. 489, 63 C.C.C. (3) 97. 
128 At the time, § 203 of the Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, provided that: “Every one who 
by criminal negligence causes death to another person is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to 
imprisonment for life.” 
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concluded that the foetus129 was not a person for purposes of the statute since it had died in 
the birth canal and thus was not born alive.130  In its decision the Court relied solely on the 
legislative history of the Criminal Code and did not reach the policy issues raised by holding 
that a foetus was not a person.131  
 In Regina v. Drummond,132 the Ontario Court of Justice relied on Regina v. Sullivan and 
Lemay in forbidding the prosecution of Brenda Drummond, a mentally ill woman who was 
pregnant.  Ms. Drummond inserted a pellet rifle into her vagina and fired, causing a pellet to 
be lodged in the foetus’ brain.  The foetus was delivered alive, and subsequently had surgery 
to remove the pellet. The prosecutor charged Ms. Drummond with attempted murder, and 
defense counsel moved to quash for failing to “disclos[e]… an offense known to law.”133 
The court held that the crime of attempted murder could not be established, because a 
foetus was not a child under the Canadian Criminal Code, and therefore, at the time the 
mother fired the pellet rifle, she could not form the necessary intent to kill.134 
 
b. Tort Liability and Civil Commitment 
 In the late 1990s, the Supreme Court of Canada first confronted the question of 
whether a foetus should be considered a legal person in the common law context.  In Dobson 
v. Dobson, the Court held that the foetus should not be considered a person separate from its 
                                                          
129 In discussing Canadian law, I will be using the Canadian spelling - “foetus” - rather than the American 
“fetus.” 
130 [1991] 1 S.C.R. 489 ¶ 21. 
131 Id. at ¶ 22.  The Supreme Court concluded that the British Columbia Court of Appeal had “reviewed and 
analyzed the law on this point in a very thorough manner,” id. at ¶20, and the lower court’s opinion 
provides a useful overview of British and Canadian common law and statutory enactments in regard to 
causing injury or death to a fetus. Regina v. Sullivan, 43 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (B.C. Ct. App. 1988).  
132 143 D.L.R. (4th) (Ont. Ct. Just. 1996). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at ¶¶ 28-32.  Ultimately, Ms. Drummond, whose lawyer asserted that she was so depressed that she 
did not know that she was pregnant, pleaded guilty to failing to provide the necessities of life to her son 
after he was born.  She was not sentenced to jail. Toronto Star, Feb. 4, 1997, at A10.  
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mother.  The Court stated that “The relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus 
is unique and innately recognized as one of great and special importance to society.”135 In 
Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F),136 the Court declared, “Before 
birth the mother and unborn child are one in the sense that ‘[t]he “life of the foetus is 
intimately connected with, and cannot be regarded in isolation from, the life of the pregnant 
woman[.]’”137 In this case, the Court held that a pregnant woman addicted to solvents could 
not be civilly committed in order to receive substance abuse treatment against her will.138  In 
Dobson the Court held that a pregnant woman could not be found liable in tort for alleged 
negligence while driving which caused harm to her foetus, even though a third party who 
drove negligently could be held liable. 
Winnipeg Child & Family Services presented a tragic set of circumstances.  Ms. G.D.F. 
was a young aboriginal woman139 who was addicted to solvents (glue) and had already given 
birth to three children, two of whom had been injured as a result of their exposure to 
solvents in utero.140  When Ms. G.D.F. became pregnant again she intermittently both 
sought and rejected treatment for her addiction.  Treatment was not initially available, but 
after a slot in a treatment program opened up the local child welfare agency came to Ms. 
G.D.F.’s home to take her to a treatment facility.  As she was intoxicated at this time she 
                                                          
135 Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 ¶ 1. 
136 3 S.C.R. 925 (1997). 
137 Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 3 S.C.R. 925 
¶¶ 27 (1997), citing Paton v. United Kingdom, 3 E.H.R.R. 408, 415 (1980). 
138 In this decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the conclusion reached by most, but not all, lower courts, 
that the term “child” within the meaning of various provincial child protection statutes did not include an 
foetus and that courts’ parens patriae jurisdiction was not broad enough to authorize a Caesarian section 
without the mother’s consent, Re Baby R., 53 D.L.R. (4th) 69 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1988), or other involuntary 
detention of a pregnant woman for the benefit of her  foetus, Re A., 72 D.L.R. (4th) 722 (Ont. Fam. Ct. 
1990), but see Children’s Aid Society of Belleville v. T. (L.)., 4 A.C.W.S. (3d) 192, 59 O.R. (2d) 204 (Ont. 
Prov. Ct (Fam. Div.) 1987) (holding that an “unborn child” is a person within the purview of the Child and 
Family Services Act). 
139 Canadian cases refer to native peoples either as “First Nations” or, more recently, as “aboriginals.” 
140 Francoise Baylis, Case Comment and Note: Dissenting with the Dissent: Winnipeg Child and Family 
Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.), 36 Alta L. Rev. 785, 785-86 (1998). 
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refused to enter treatment.141  The agency sought a court order to detain her for treatment at 
the Health Sciences Center.  The trial court granted the request, relying on provincial mental 
health law and the doctrine of parens patriae to justify its order for civil commitment.142   
 On appeal, both the Manitoba Court of Appeal143 and the Supreme Court of Canada 
rejected the trial court’s approach.  The Supreme Court began with the premise that “the 
[common] law of Canada does not recognize the unborn child as a legal or juridical 
person.”144  After asking whether the rule should be changed in circumstances in which “a 
mother is acting in a way which may harm her unborn child,”145 the Court concluded that it 
should not.  The Court emphasized that “’[a]scribing personhood to a foetus in law is a 
fundamentally normative task.  It results in the recognition of rights and duties—a matter 
which falls outsider the concerns of scientific classification.’”146   
 The Court gave four reasons for declining to hold that a foetus should be considered 
a person with rights separate from those of its mother. First, as a matter of separation of 
powers, the Court held that the legislature was in a superior position to the courts to weigh 
the policy implications of law change.  Nonetheless, commenting on those policy concerns, 
the Court observed that a decision upholding the civil commitment of pregnant women 
might be counterproductive, either because women with substance abuse problems might 
not seek prenatal care out of fear of detection and consequent involuntary commitment, or 
because drug-addicted women might choose abortion rather than be forced to give up 
                                                          
141 Laura Shanner, Case Comment and Note: Pregnancy Intervention and Models of Maternal-Fetal 
Relationship: Philosophical Reflections on the Winnipeg C.F.S. Dissent, 36 Alta. L. Rev. 751, 752, n. 11 
(1998). 
142 After two days, the order was stayed, and ultimately overturned on appeal.  However, Ms. G.D.F. 
remained at the Health Sciences Centre for several days, and ultimately stopped sniffing glue and “gave 
birth to an apparently normal child.” Winnipeg Child & Family Services (Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.),    
S.C.R.   ¶2 (1997) . 
143 138 D.L.R. (4th) 254 (1996). 
144 Id. at ¶11. 
145 Id. at ¶5. 
146 Id. at ¶12. 
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drugs.147  Second, viewing its decision on civil commitment as a matter of tort law, the Court 
noted that no common law country permitted a child to sue for prenatal injuries unless it 
was born alive.  Third, and most importantly, the court noted that once a decision was made 
to treat the foetus as a person separate from its mother, it would be impossible to find a 
principled basis on which to limit tort liability.  Fourth, imposing such liability would conflict 
with women’s right to autonomy and equality.   
 Combining these latter two concerns, the Court described the slippery slope onto 
which courts would be launched in trying to decide whether a pregnant woman should face 
the possibility of tort liability or involuntary civil commitment: 
 One faces the ‘spectre of mothers being sued by their children for various 
 activities of lifestyle choices, such as smoking, drinking and the taking or 
 refusal of medication, during pregnancy that injure the child, with the result 
 that mothers will be unable to control their own bodies and make autonomous 
 choices.’148 
 …. 
 …. 
 ‘[ A woman’ could …be held liable for any behavior during pregnancy having 
 potentially adverse effects on her fetus, including failing to eat properly, using 
 prescription, nonprescription and illegal drugs, smoking, drinking alcohol,  
 exposing herself to infectious disease or to workplace hazards, engaging in 
 immoderate exercise or sexual intercourse, residing at high altitudes for  
 prolonged periods, or using a general anesthetic or drugs to induce rapid labor 
 during delivery.’149 
 
 Importantly, the Court also challenged the myth of autonomous choice facing drug-
addicted women, and urged that the policy decisions about how best to protect fetuses be 
made in the actual context of pregnant substance abusers’ lives.  The Court observed: 
 
 [L]lifestyle “choices” like alcohol consumption, drug abuse, and poor nutrition  
 may be the products of circumstance and illness rather than free choice capable  
 of effective deterrence by the legal sanction of tort. … Treating pregnant  
                                                          
147 Id. at ¶¶ 20,44. 
148 Id. at ¶ 34, citing Hoyt, C.J., in Dobson v. Dobson, 148 D.L.R. (4th) (N.B. Ct. App. 1997). 
149 Id. at ¶ 39, citing D.E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional 
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 Yale L. J. 599, 606-07 (1986).   
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 substance abusers as fetal abusers ignores the range of conditions that contribute  
 to problems like drug addiction and lack of nutrition, such as limited quality  
 pre-natal care, lack of food for impoverished women, and lack of treatment  
 for substance abusers.150 
 
 Finally, the Court also considered the question of whether a parens patriae theory 
justified the involuntary commitment of pregnant women.  The Court concluded that it did 
not,151 holding:  
 [T]he invasion of liberty involved in making court orders affecting the  
 unborn child, is of a different order than the invasion of liberty involved  
 in court orders relating to born children. … The court cannot make decisions  
 for the  unborn child without inevitably making decisions for the mother  
 herself.  The intrusion is therefore far greater than simply limiting the  
 mother’s choices concerning her child… [and] would seriously intrude on  
 the rights of women.152  
 
 The Supreme Court used a similar analytical approach in Dobson v. Dobson.153  The 
case raised the question of whether a child who suffered permanent brain injuries due to his 
mother’s allegedly negligent driving while pregnant could sue her for this prenatal harm.154 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’ decisions to let the suit go forward, holding 
that due to the unique nature of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her foetus 
the woman cannot be held liable for allegedly tortious conduct while the foetus was in utero.  
Although the Court conceded that children had been permitted to sue third parties for 
negligently caused prenatal injuries, it found that these cases were readily distinguishable 
from suits for injuries allegedly caused by a pregnant woman’s negligence.  The Court 
                                                          
150 Id. at ¶41. 
151 Id. at ¶¶ 49-57.   
152 Id. at ¶56.     
153 Dobson v. Dobson, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 753 ¶ 1. 
154 The two lower courts ruled that the child could sue his mother for injuries incurred while he was in 
utero.  The New Brunswick trial court permitted the child to sue, analogizing to established precedent that 
permitted a child, once born, to sue third-parties for injuries suffered prior to birth. Dobson v. Dobson, 186 
N.B.R. (2d) 81 (1997), citing Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille [1933] S.C.R. 456.  The New Brunswick 
Court of Appeal upheld this decision, asserting that because the mother’s alleged negligence was due to her 
driving, in a case in which she owed a duty of care to the world not to drive negligently, it was appropriate 
to hold that she had a duty to her foetus as well. Dobson v. Dobson, 189 N.B.R. (2d) 208 (1997). 
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declared, “There is no other relationship in the realm of human existence which can serve as 
a basis for comparison.”155   
 In considering whether tort duties should be imposed on pregnant women, the 
Dobson court first assumed arguendo that a pregnant woman and her foetus could be treated as 
separate entities.  It concluded that there would be no limit to the circumstances under 
which the woman could be held liable, due to the extraordinarily close physical proximity 
between the woman and her foetus, and the enormous range of actions which the woman 
could take which could have a detrimental effect on foetal development.156 The Court noted, 
“Everything the pregnant woman eats or drinks, and every physical action she takes, may 
affect the foetus.”157  The Court identified two important public policy concerns “militat[ing] 
against the imposition of maternal tort liability for prenatal negligence[:] …the privacy and 
autonomy rights of women and … the difficulties inherent in articulating a judicial standard 
of conduct for pregnant women.”158  Addressing women’s interest in autonomy, the Court 
emphasized that simply because a woman is pregnant she does not lose “the right to make 
person decisions, to control [her]… bodily integrity, and to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.”159   
The Court linked these concerns to the difficulty in developing a workable judicial 
standard of conduct for pregnant women, finding that it would be impossible to articulate an 
objective standard, since every pregnant woman’s life is different, with women who are well-
educated and ignorant, rich and poor, and with and without access to good health care and 
                                                          
155 Dobson v. Dobson ¶ 25. 
156 Dobson v. Dobson, ¶ 20. 
157 Id. at ¶27. 
158 Dobson ¶ 21. 
159 Dobson ¶ 32, citing the Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies, 2 Proceed with Care 
955-56 (1993).  
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good prenatal care.160 The Court also observed that any “reasonable pregnant woman” 
standard that would develop would inevitably be interpreted in light of the trier of fact’s 
prejudices about proper conduct of pregnant women.161  As in Winnipeg Child & Family 
Services, the Court invoked the slippery slope, concluding that there was no principled way to 
identify conduct on the part of a pregnant woman that was, or was not, negligent, and 
therefore declined to recognize a cause of action in tort.162 The Court held out the possibility 
that Parliament could develop a tailored solution that would address the needs of brain-
injured children, as had the British Parliament in enacting the Congenital Disabilities Act.  
The Court concluded that such a legislative solution would meet both separation of powers 
concerns and permit a more careful consideration of the public policy issues. 163  
 
c. Abortion Law   
 Canada’s abortion jurisprudence is consistent with the approach taken by the 
Supreme Court in Dobson and Winnipeg Child and Family Services.  In its landmark 1988 
decision in Regina v. Morgenthaler,164 the Court invalidated Canada’s criminal abortion law165  
without focusing on foetal personhood. The Morgentaler court found that the abortion law’s 
provisions, which placed the decision about whether a woman could have an abortion solely 
within the hands of a three member physician committee, violated women’s right to 
“security of the person” under Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.166  
                                                          
160 Dobson ¶ 54. 
161  
162 Dobson ¶¶ 60-62, 66. 
163 Dobson ¶¶64-65, 67-68.  As described by the Court, this law creates a very limited exception to the 
general rule that pregnant women are not liable for negligent conduct vis a vis their foetuses, except in the 
limited circumstances in which they are operating a motor vehicle, and then, only to the limits of their 
insurance policy.  
164 1 S.C. R. 30 (1988). 
165 Criminal Code § 251. 
166 R. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C. R. 30, 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385. [1988] S.C. R. at 40-47, 78-79.  
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Under the law, many women faced considerable delay in obtaining an abortion, as many 
needed to seek permission for abortion at multiple hospitals because of uncertainty about 
whether permission would be granted.  In addition to the psychological stress caused by 
uncertainty and delay, many women were also burdened by the fact that the medical 
procedure they sought was regulated under the criminal law.  The Court concluded that by 
removing women entirely from the decision-making process, this system deprived them of 
the “security of the person” protected by Section Seven of the Charter.  Concurring Justice 
Deetz stated the Court’s reasoning succinctly:  “A pregnant woman's person cannot be said 
to be secure if, when her life or health is in danger, she is faced with a rule of criminal law 
which precludes her from obtaining effective and timely medical treatment.”167 Concurring 
Justice Wilson was the strongest in her critique of the abortion law,168 although she 
nonetheless recognized the state interest in protecting the potential human life that a foetus 
represented.   Justice Wilson reasoned that the governmental interest in protecting that life 
must vary with the stage of foetal development, suggesting in dicta that the governmental 
interest did not become compelling until somewhere in the second trimester.169   
A year later, in Daigle v. Tremblay,170 the Court directly addressed the question of the 
legal status of the foetus.  In this case, a pregnant woman’s physically abusive male partner 
sought an injunction to prevent her from having an abortion.  After a lengthy litigation 
process, played out in the Canadian press, the Supreme Court ruled that the man had no 
                                                          
167 Id. at 105. 
168 Justice Wilson concluded that the criminal abortion provision contravened both the security and liberty 
interests protected by Section 7. 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449, Id. at    .  Relying on John Stuart Mill and on 
American jurisprudence which had developed a constitutional right to privacy, Justice Wilson declared that 
Section 7 of the Charter “guarantees to every individual a degree of personal autonomy over important 
decisions intimately affecting their private lives,” and that this liberty interest includes “the decision of a 
woman to terminate her pregnancy.” Id. at 551-54.  
169 37 C.C.C. (3d) at 563-64. 
170 [1989] S.C. R. 530.  
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right to prevent the abortion because, under Canadian and Quebecois law, a foetus was not a 
“juridical person,” with rights and legal protections while in utero.171  
Yet despite the decisions of the Supreme Court in Morgentaler that performing an 
abortion may not be made criminal, access to abortion can still be difficult in Canada, due to 
strong opposition to abortion in some provinces and the poverty and geographic isolation of 
many women.172  Although the Health Canada Act requires that all medically necessary 
services be covered under provincial insurance plans, in fact provinces vary widely in the 
extent to which they fund abortions, often distinguishing between hospitals, which are fully 
funded, and clinics, where funding may be partial.173  British Columbia and Ontario, for 
example, fund abortions fully under provincial health insurance plans, while other provincial 
health plans do not fully cover abortions performed at clinics, which may be more likely to 
be found in rural areas.174  Even in provinces which fully fund abortion services, there are 
few hospitals and clinics which perform abortions, leading to waiting times.175   Prince 
Edward Island has no hospital or clinic where abortions are preformed, so that its women 
must leave the province to seek care, leading to waiting times of up to a month.176  For 
young and poor women, as well as those in rural areas, this can be a significant obstacle to 
obtaining an abortion.177 
 
                                                          
171 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reviewed prior Canadian decisions, as well as precedential French 
and British legislative and judicial authorities and declared that there was no basis for finding that a foetus 
had legal personhood under Quebec law.  Id. at ¶¶ 47-72.  
172 Abortion Services in Canada:  A Patchwork Quilt with Many Holes, 164 Can. Med. Ass’n J. 847, 847-
848 (2001), available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/164/6/847. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 849, noting that only three out of 99 hospitals perform abortions in Alberta, and that there are only 
two clinics in the entire province, leading to waiting times of two or more weeks even in a large city like 
Calgary.  
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 848. 
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d. Assisted Reproductive Technology   
 Canada has acted to address concerns about the birth of healthy children through its 
regulation of assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.).  In 2004, with the passage of the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, Canada created a uniform approach to the use of this 
technology, establishing a federal agency to oversee its use.178  This agency, Assisted Human 
Reproduction Agency Canada, is charged with promoting the health and well-being of both 
children born through A.R.T. and the women who use its technologies, whom the Act states 
are “more than men directly and significantly affected by …[ A.R.T.].” 179 In order to 
accomplish this goal, the agency is mandated to inspect and license facilities performing 
A.R.T., as well as to gather and publish data regarding the success of various A.R.T. 
procedures.  Both of these functions are designed to promote informed consent, which the 
Act deems a “fundamental condition of the use of human reproductive technologies.”180   
The Act also prohibits the commercialization of any aspect of A.R.T.181  Thus, in contrast to 
the state-by-state regulatory approach of the United States, the Act establishes a uniform 
national regulatory scheme for the use of A.R.T., eliminating differences among provinces in 
the laws governing its use.  Unlike France, this law does not mandate any government 
support for couples seeking to use A.R.T. 
 
2.  Health Care Access 
 Of course, the fact that Canadian courts do not recognize foetuses as juridical 
persons tells us nothing about whether pregnant women receive adequate health care under 
the Canadian health care system.  Although Medicare, as the Canadian health system is 
                                                          
178 Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004, c.2, assented to Mar. 29, 2004. 
179 Id., Principles § 2.(a) and (c).  
180 Id., Principles § 2.(d). 
181 181 Id., Prohibited Activities, §§ 5, 6, and 7. 
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known, provides universal coverage, in reality access to appropriate health care and to other 
prerequisites for health is not equal across class and racial lines. In addition to the problems 
with abortion access noted above, there are many people who do not receive appropriate 
health care under the Medicare system. Aboriginal peoples in particular lack adequate health 
care, housing, and nutrition, and their health status reflects these deficits. 182   
At present, there are inadequate treatment resources for alcohol and other drug 
addictions across Canada.183  Women who acknowledge their addiction and seek treatment 
face “devastating barriers to treatment.”184  Women are inhibited in their reporting of 
substance abuse because of the stigma and negative stereotypes about their behavior and 
because they fear losing custody of their children.185  As in the United States, poor women 
and women of color are significantly more likely to be screened for substance abuse than 
middle class women.186  Further, treatment programs are not designed to reflect the special 
factors that predispose women to substance abuse compared to men, or to offer more 
supportive, less judgmental interventions to protect women and their fetuses.187  Both 
epidemiological studies and a review of the cases in which judicial intervention to protect the 
foetus has been sought suggest a strong connection between domestic violence and the use 
of alcohol and other drugs by pregnant women.188  Nonetheless, Canada is attempting to 
                                                          
182 Sanda Rogers, Case Comment and Note: Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. D.F.G.: Juridical 
Interference with Pregnant Women in the Alleged Interest of the Fetus, 36 Alta L. Rev. 711, 723 (1998) 
(hereinafter Juridical Interference.) 
183Nancy Poole and Coleen Anne Dell for the Canadian Center on Substance Abuse, Girls, Women, and 
Substance Use 10 (2005). 
184 Poole and Dell, supra, at 9. 
185 Id. at 6, 9. 
186 Id. at 7.  See also Chasnoff, supra n. [8] (presenting data that in the United States, black women are ten 
times more likely than white women to be referred for drug testing, despite equivalent drug use). 
187 Id. at 10. 
188 Id. at 7;  Rogers, supra, Juridical Interference at 723, n. 66, citing the Ethics Committee of the Society 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of Canada (SOCG), Healthy Beginnings, Guidelines for Care During 
Pregnancy and Childbirth, No. 18, Dec. 1995, which found that, “The literature regarding abuse during 
pregnancy reveals that one in twelve women are victims of violence. In Canada, forty percent of wife 
assaults begin during the time of the woman’s first pregnancy.” See also Sheilah Martin, Article: Judicial 
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address its growing substance abuse problem.  In 2007 it announced a national campaign to 
prevent and treat substance abuse among Canadians aged fifteen and twenty-four, who 
constitute 60% of illicit drug users, focusing on prevention rather than incarceration as its 
primary tool. 189 
 
3.  Social and Economic Support for Children and their Families  
 Canada provides pregnant women and new parents with several economic supports 
that permit them to be at home with a new child for a maximum of sixty-five weeks.190  
Qualifying individuals can receive up to fifteen weeks of sickness benefits, fifteen weeks of 
maternity benefits, and thirty-five weeks of parental benefits.191  These benefits reimburse 
55% of a worker’s earnings up to a maximum of $22,620 per year, thus providing a greater 
relative benefit to low- and middle-income workers.192  Parents who return to work while 
still receiving maternity or sickness benefits will have their benefits reduced “dollar for 
dollar” by the amount they earn, but parents may retain a portion of parental benefits even if 
they return to work.193   
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
 
Intervention in Pregnancy, 40 McGill L. J. 947, 957, n.39 (1995) (discussing the cases of Superintendent of 
Family and Child Service v. M.(B.), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 330 (B.C.S.C. 1982), and Re Children’s Aid Society 
for the District of Kenora and J. L., 134 D.L. R. (3d) 249 (1981), in which the courts considering whether 
newborns should be removed from their mothers due to the mothers drug use while pregnant noted that the 
women in question were the victims of male violence. See also Erin Nelson, Reconceiving Pregnancy:  
Expressive Choice and Legal Reasoning, 49 McGill L. J. 593, 623-24 (2004).   
189 Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, A Drug prevention Strategy for Canada’s Youth (2007), available 
at http://www.ccsa.ca. 
190 Service Canada, Employment Insurance (EI) and Maternity, Parental, and Sickness Benefits, available at 
http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/ei/ types/special.shtml (hereinafter cited as Service Canada. 
191 Id.  To qualify, the individual must have worked at least 600 hours during the last 52 weeks. In addition, 
to qualify for maternity benefits, the individual must have been pregnant.  Parental benefits are for a 
couple, to be shared among the two parents as they elect.  
192 Id. This benefit is in Canadian dollars.  An additional Family Supplement is given to low income 
families (those earning below $25,921(Canadian)) and is increased for families who have children under 
aged six. Service Canada, Employment Insurance (EI) and the Family Supplement, available at 
http://www1.servicecanada.gc.ca/en/ei/service/family_supplement.shtml.  
193 Id.  
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B.   France 
 1.  The Legal Framework Regarding Fetuses 
 a.  Introduction  
 The French position on fetal protection might best be described as one of 
supporting the potential for new human life represented by pregnancy, but not treating 
either embryos or fetuses as fully human, drawing a bright line at birth.  Thus, French law 
promotes the birth of children through state-regulated and state-funded assisted 
reproductive technology, as well as significant economic support to encourage French 
citizens to have larger families.  France provides universal health care to children and adults 
and French law mandates generous maternity leaves and other benefits to defray the costs of 
having more children.  It also limits pregnant women’s ability to work in hazardous 
conditions.  At the same time, French law appears to respect women’s rights to control their 
bodies and the health care they receive.  This is evidenced by the declaration of the National 
Consultative Committee of Ethics194 that intervention in a pregnant woman’s right to refuse 
medical treatment should rarely be overridden, and through the availability of government-
funded abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy.   
As in Canada, a unified judicial system and a strong national Parliament establish a 
uniform system of laws throughout the country.  The highest French court, la Cour de 
Cassation,195 has recognized a civil cause of action against third parties for harm caused prior 
                                                          
194 La Comite Consultatif National d’Ethique pour les sciences de la vie et de la santé  (CCNE) is an 
appointed body which is consulted by the president or a government minister for its recommendations on 
bioethical issues, which then form the basis for legislative action.  See Loi n° 94-654 du 29 juillet 1994 and 
Décret n° 97-555 du 29 mai 1997 relatif au Comité consultatif national d'éthique pour les sciences de la vie 
et de la santé available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/francais/start.htm. 
195 The Cour de Cassation is the main court of last resort in France on civil, criminal, social and commercial 
matters. It deals with appeals (called “pourvoi en cassation”) taken from the Courts of Appeals (“Cours 
d’Appel”).  See http://www.courdecassation.fr/_Accueil/francais/francais.htm. Cases against the state or 
local authorities are decided by the “Tribunaux Administratifs” and appealed to the “Conseil d’Etat,” the 
 45
to birth by medical malpractice,196 but Parliament has effectively overturned this decision, by 
limiting the relief available in such cases and providing that the compensation is for the 
parents of the injured child for their losses, rather than directed to the child itself.  Most 
significantly, in homicide cases French law has consistently recognized birth as a bright line.  
The Cour de Cassation has held repeatedly that because a fetus is not a person, no homicide 
charges may be brought against a party who causes the death of a fetus, whether the 
defendant is a doctor or another third party, such as a drunk driver.197  No French woman 
has ever been criminally prosecuted for conduct causing harm or death to her fetus, nor has 
any French woman been civilly committed as a means of preventing harm to her fetus, even 
though there is rising concern that the alcohol consumption of French women is putting 
children at risk.198   
 
b.   Criminal Law     
 (1.)  Homicide Prosecutions 
 In three cases decided in the last eight years, the Cour de Cassation has held that a 
fetus is not a “juridical person,” and thus one who causes the death of a fetus cannot be 
prosecuted for homicide.199  Two cases arose out of medical malpractice, while the other 
involved fetal death as a result of a motor vehicle accident.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
court of last resort for those cases.  See “le Conseil d’Etat en bref” at http://www.conseil-
etat.fr/ce/missio/index_mi_ce01.shtml. 
196 See discussion infra in text accompanying n’s  [ - ]. 
197 See discussion infra in text accompanying n’s  [ - ]. 
198Estimates of the number of children born in France affected by fetal alcohol syndrome range between 1.3 
and 3.5 per 1,000 infants. See Didier Mennecier, Alcool et Grossesse, quoting the national survey 
conducted by the French Government,“Enquête nationale périnatale 1998”, and available at 
http://www.sante.gouv.fr/htm/dossiers/perinat/somm2.htm 
199 A striking transatlantic comparison of this difference between French and American law was brought 
home by the murder prosecution of Thierry Gaitaud, a French citizen who had long lived in the United 
States, who was charged with killing his American wife, who was pregnant at the time, in San Diego.  
Under French law, any citizen of France may choose to be tried in France for crimes committed 
extraterritorially, and because France does not have the death penalty while California does, Gaitaud 
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 The “Vo” case,200 which attracted the most attention, involved a physician’s mistaken 
identification of a patient, which led him to commit malpractice.  Two women of 
Vietnamese ancestry, both surnamed Vo, were patients at the same hospital.201  One patient 
was six months pregnant, and the other patient was there to have an IUD removed.  The 
defendant physician called out to the waiting room for Madame Vo, and the pregnant 
patient responded.  Without any preliminary physical examination, the physician attempted 
to remove the IUD he believed the woman was carrying.  Instead, he ruptured the amniotic 
sac surrounding the fetus, ultimately causing its demise at the age of twenty to twenty-one 
weeks.202  Apparently because of the difficulties of bringing a medical malpractice case in 
France,203 Madame Vo instead sought a criminal prosecution, and the physician was charged 
with unintentional homicide.204  After a complicated procedural history, the case reached the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
elected to go to trial in France.  During the trial the judge observed that the fetus was viable, describing 
“the little baby in Susan’s womb, who was only about fifteen days from being born – the baby who have 
been your son.  I’ve seen pictures of the fetus, and it was a real baby, with hands and fingers….” Yet there 
was never a suggestion that Gaitaud could be charged with more than one homicide under French law. 
Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems:  An American on Trial for an American Murder in 
the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 791, 793 (2001) (hereinafter The Intersection of Two 
Systems).   
200 French criminal cases are generally not cited by the names of the defendants, but by their decision 
numbers and dates.    
201 Vo. France, Application no. 53924/00 (European Court of Human Rights 2004), at ¶¶ 10-11, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng.GrandChamber judgmentVovFrance080704.  
202 Id. at ¶¶ 11-12, 14. 
203 These difficulties include problems in suing physicians, many of whom are state employees, and the 
prolonged nature of malpractice litigation.  The latter problem is exemplified by the case of Nicholas 
Perruche, discussed infra at text accompanying n’s [    -   ] , whose case took fourteen years to progress 
through French courts.  
204 Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.  This is the term used to describe the crime of “homicide involontaire,” Criminal Code 
Article 319, under which the defendant was prosecuted, in the English version of the European Court of 
Human Rights decision in Vo. Article 319 provided that, “Anyone who through his or her inadvertence, 
negligent act, inattention, negligent omission or breach of regulation unintentionally commits homicide or 
unintentionally causes death, shall be liable to imprisonment of between three months and two years and a 
fine of between 1,000 and 30,000 francs.”  Through a reorganization of the Penal Code, this crime is now 
prosecuted under Article 221-6, which provides that, “Causing the death of another person by clumsiness, 
negligence, carelessness, recklessness or breach of an obligation of safety or prudence imposed by statute 
or regulations, constitutes manslaughter punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of € 45,000.” 
The French Penal Code is available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_penal_text.  
For purposes of consistency, I will use the term unintentional homicide throughout this section. 
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Cour de Cassation.205  That court noted the scientific uncertainty surrounding the precise 
moment at which a zygote becomes an embryo, an embryo becomes a fetus, and a fetus 
becomes viable, and declared that this uncertain and contingent status precluded it from 
upholding a homicide conviction in light of the principle that penal laws are to be strictly 
construed.206     
 The European Court of Human Rights upheld the decision of the Cour de Cassation 
against an appeal brought by Madame Vo.  She alleged that the failure of French law to 
recognize a fetus as a person violated Article II of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, which provides that “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”207 The 
European Court of Human Rights rejected the challenge, holding that because France 
provided adequate administrative remedies for the physician’s malpractice, it was 
unnecessary to impose a criminal sanction for the unintentional killing.208 Significantly, the 
court found that in view of the diversity of viewpoints among European member states 
about the legitimacy of abortion, the question of when life begins, and whether a fetus was a 
“person,”  it “’it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code.’” 209   
                                                          
205 The Lyons Criminal Court acquitted the physician doctor on the ground that the fetus was not a person, 
and the case was appealed. Vo. v. France at ¶¶ 19-20.  The Lyons Court of Appeal reversed the lower court 
judgment, holding that the doctor was guilty of unintentional homicide and imposing a heavy fine and a 
suspended six month prison sentence. Id. at ¶ 21.  The physician then appealed.   
       206 Id. at ¶ 22, see also Vo case, Cour de Cassation, June 30, 1999, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=101247&indice=1&table=CASS&ligneDeb=1.  
207 Id. at ¶ 46. 
208 Id. at ¶¶ 91-95.  Notably absent from the opinion of either the Cour de Cassation or the European Court 
of Human Rights was any meaningful discussion of the circumstances under which Madame Vo 
experienced negligent treatment from a physician, or the racism or language barrier that could have 
precipitated this incident.  Why, for example, did the treating physician not ask Madame Vo why she was 
visiting him, rather than immediately reaching into her uterus ?  
209 Id. at ¶¶ 82, 87-95. 
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In two opinions rendered after its decision in the Vo case, the Cour de Cassation 
reiterated its view that birth was essential to a homicide prosecution.  The first, the Potonet 
case, also involved medical malpractice.  A midwife and physician were charged with 
unintentional homicide based on allegations that they failed to act swiftly enough after a 
pregnant woman (Madame Potonet) alerted them to the irregular heartbeat of her fetus 
during a difficult labor and the fetus was stillborn. The Cour de Cassation declared explicitly 
that no conviction for involuntary manslaughter was possible because a fetus becomes a 
human person only after birth.210 
 The Cour de Cassation also took this view in a case involving the death of a fetus as 
a result of harm to a pregnant woman as the result of a motor vehicle accident.  In the 
Grosmangin case, in which a driver injured a pregnant woman and caused the death of her six 
month old fetus, the Court upheld the driver’s conviction for involuntary harm to the 
woman but ruled that he could not be convicted of involuntary manslaughter of the fetus.  
The Court held that the principle of “legality of offenses and punishments which requires a 
strict interpretation of penal law precludes the extension of the law on unintentional 
homicide to the child to be born, whose legal status is enshrined in particular texts dealing 
with embryos and fetuses.”211  The Grosmangin decision was followed in a subsequent lower 
                                                          
210Cour de Cassation, Chambre Criminelle, 2002-06-25, 00-81359 (Publication: Bulletin criminel 2002 N° 
144 p. 531).  The court declared, « il ne peut y avoir d'homicide involontaire du foetus, celui-ci ne devenant 
une personne humaine qu'après la naissance. »  
211 Grosmangin case, Cour de Cassation, Assemblée plénière, 2001-06-29, 99-85973, (publication: Bulletin 
2001 A. P. N° 8 p. 19 ; La Semaine juridique, 2001-07-18, n° 29 p. 1432).  The Court declared: « le 
principe de la légalité des délits et des peines, qui impose une interprétation stricte de la loi pénale, s'oppose 
à ce que l'incrimination prévue par l'article 221-6 du Code pénal, réprimant l'homicide involontaire d'autrui, 
soit étendue au cas de l'enfant à naître dont le régime juridique relève de textes particuliers sur l'embryon 
ou le fœtus. » 
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court case involving an automobile accident in which both the pregnant woman and her 
fetus were killed.212           
 
(2.)  Prosecutions for Other Fetal Harm      
 French law makes it a crime to terminate a pregnancy without the woman’s 
consent.”213 It is a lesser crime to terminate pregnancy past the legal time limit for 
abortion,214 or when the one who terminates the pregnancy is not a physician, or when the 
procedure is not performed in an approved hospital.215  In addition, it is a crime to furnish a 
pregnant woman “with the physical means to practice a termination of pregnancy on 
herself.”216 Defendants who habitually perform these acts are subject to more severe 
sanctions.217  However, since abortion became legal in 1975,218 no French woman has ever 
been criminally charged for causing harm to her fetus.219   
 
 
 
                                                          
212 Elias case, C.A. Metz, Chambre des Appels Correctionnels, 17 février 2005 (affaire n° A 04/00700 G. 
Kévin, CA n° 05/222). 
213 French Penal Code Article 223-10.   This article, and the others discussed in this paragraph, are in a 
section of the Penal Code separate from the one addressing “Offenses Against Life.” 
214 French abortion law is discussed infra, in section c. (4). 
215 French Penal Code Article 223-11. 
216 French Penal Code Article 223-12. 
217 French Penal Code Articles 223-11-12. 
218 Abortion was made legal on January 17, 1975, by the Law Veil, Law n°75-17, authorizing abortion at 
any time up to ten weeks when the pregnant woman was in a “state of distress.” Critics of the law objected 
to its seven day waiting period, and the requirement that women undergo a psychological interview prior to 
receiving an abortion.  Although the 1975 law had a "sunset provision" of five years, it was renewed with 
minor changes in 1979.  Law No. 79-1204 of Dec. 31, 1979, J.O., Jan. 1, 1980, p.3, available at 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/France.abo.htm. 
219 Before the Law Neurwith of 1967, which authorized the disclosure of information on contraceptive 
means, and the Law Weil of 1975, the repressive Law of 1920 governed. This law forbade any disclosure 
of information on contraceptive means and imposed the death penalty on those who performed abortions.  
The last person executed for this crime was Marie-Louise Giraud, a laundress from Cherbourg, who was 
convicted of having carried out 27 abortions and guillotined in the yard of Roquette Prison in Paris. See 
Marcel Viaud, La libre disposition de son corps, Réfractions numéro 7.  
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c.   Civil Protection of the Embryo and Fetus 
 (1.)  Assisted Reproductive Technology  
 In contrast to the United States, where assisted reproductive technology (A.R.T.)220 
flourishes in a market-driven setting and is subject to an incomplete “patchwork” of state 
and federal regulation,221 France was an early pioneer in the regulation of A.R.T.  Since 1994 
France has recognized the potential benefits of A.R.T as well as its risks, and has developed 
a comprehensive set of safeguards to promote A.R.T’s ethical and equitable use.  France 
promotes the use of A.R.T. in infertile couples, by funding up to six cycles of artificial 
insemination and four cycles of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer for any 
heterosexual couple in which the woman is under age forty-three.222 Each year, about one in 
a hundred French children is born through in vitro fertilization.223  The French embrace of 
ART is consistent with France’s long-standing pronatalist policy,224 which is also apparent in 
the extensive economic supports provided families with young children and the generous 
maternity benefits mandated for working women.225  
                                                          
220 In France, the technology is known as Medically Assisted Procreation or MAP and is defined by article 
L. 2141-1 of the Public Health Code (“Code de la Santé Publique”). Act n° 94-654 of July 29, 1994 
addressed “the donation and use of human body parts and derivatives, medically assisted procreation and 
antenatal diagnosis.” 
221 See generally Judith Daar, Reproductive Technologies and the Law 687-693 (2006), and Jennifer L. 
Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should t he Law Protect Them From 
Harm?, 57 Utah L. Rev. 57 (2004).   
222 Articles L152-1 to L152-19 of the Public Health Code (“Code de la Santé Publique”) inserted by the 
Law n° 94-654 of July 29, 1994 art. 8 Journal Officiel of July 30, 1994). To obtain government support, the 
couple must either be married or have lived together for at least two years. The government reimburses 
these ART services fully if they are performed in a public hospital and to a lesser amount if they are 
performed in a private hospital or clinic.  Thus, there are still economic disparities in who may avail 
themselves of ART, but it is not as great as in the United States. It is illegal for same sex couples to practice 
ART and French women in same sex couples often go to Belgium, where it is authorized, to practice it.    
223 See Bruce Crumley,  Maman? Papa? Oncle? A 62-year-old and her brother take home 'their' two 
children — her womb, his sperm, another mother, 158 Time Europe (No. 1), July 2, 2001.  
224 This policy is said to reflect a variety of concerns, from the need to respond to the extraordinary loss of 
young men in World War I, to the aging of the French population (21.8 percent of the population was over 
60 in 2001, according to an estimate released by the INSEE (The National Institute for Statistical and 
Economic Research), and the low but recently increasing birth rate. See the INSEE website, at  
http://www.insee.fr/en/home/home_page.asp 
225 See discussion infra in sections  -     . 
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 At the same time that government support for A.R.T. was initiated, the Bioethics 
Laws of 1994 established rules prohibiting its commercialization.226 The provisions 
concerning A.R.T. declare that egg and sperm donation is to be anonymous,227 and prohibit 
both surrogate birth arrangements228 and postmortem embryo and sperm transfer.229   All 
donation, transfer, and storage of gametes and embryos must be performed by government 
or licensed private not-for-profit organizations, which are subject to extensive regulation.230  
                                                          
226 The Bioethics Laws of 1994 were actually three separate statutes.  The first, providing for “Respect of 
the Human Body, amended the Civil Code. These provisions were added by the Act n° 94-653 of 29 July 
1994 in two new chapters of the Civil Code: Chapter II - Of Respect Of The Human Body And Chapter III- 
Of The Genetic Study Of The Particulars Of A Person And Of The Identification Of A Person Owing To 
His Genetic Prints.  The second statute, governing organ and tissue donations and ART, amended the 
Public Health Code and the Penal Code. Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994 added provisions regarding the 
“Donation and Use of Human Body Parts and Derivatives, Medically Assisted Reproduction and Antenatal 
Diagnosis.” The third statute added provisions to the Public Health Code regarding confidentiality of 
medical and research data. Act n° 94-548 of 1 July 1994 added provisions regarding “The Use of 
Nominative Data for Research Purposes in the Field of Health and Modifying Law 78-17 of 6 January 1978 
on Information, Files and Liberties.”   As the French Parliament was considering the proposed Bioethics 
Laws of 1994, the President of the National Assembly and sixty-four other deputies challenged the laws’ 
constitutionality, alleging specifically that the law, which permitted destruction of embryos as part of the 
ART process, was unconstitutional because it negated the embryos’ right to life. Under the French 
Constitution, which establishes the Conseil Constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), the President, Prime 
Minister, President of the National Assembly or Senate, or sixty deputies or senators may refer a proposed 
law to the Constitutional Council prior to its enactment for an opinion on its constitutionality.  This is the 
only opportunity for constitutional review; once the law is enacted it may no longer be challenged on 
constitutional grounds.  French Constitution, Title VII (“le Conseil Constitutionnel”), art. 61 and 62. The 
Constitutional Council ruled that the constitutional principle of human dignity applies to embryos, but not 
the right to life and the principle of equality, and therefore the selection of embryos for pre-implantation 
diagnostic procedures and the destruction of other embryos authorized under the proposed law did not raise 
constitutional concerns.226 Décision n° 94-343/344 DC, Loi relative au respect du corps humain et loi 
relative au don et à l'utilisation des éléments et produits du corps humain, à l'assistance médicale à la 
procréation et au diagnostic prenatal. Journal officiel du 29 juillet 1994, p. 11024, available in French at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/1994/94343dc.htm.    
227 Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994, Article L.152-5.  Article 16-8 of the Civil Code also mandates 
anonymity of the egg and sperm donor, as well as anonymity of the donor and recipient of human organs 
and tissues.   Section 311-19 of the Civil Code also provides that in cases of ART in which a third party is 
involved as an egg or sperm donor, no parent-child relationship exists between the donor and child thus 
created.  Section 10 of the Respect for the Human Body Act inserts in chapter I of title VII of book I of the 
Civil Code a part 4 entitled “Medically Assisted Reproduction”, comprising two new sections 311-19 and 
311-20. Section 311-19 provides that, in the case of medically assisted reproduction by donor, no 
relationship may be established between the donor and the child, and no action for remedies may be 
brought against the donor. Section 311-20 sets out the circumstances in which the applicant spouses or 
partners must first give their consent before a judge or a notary, who will inform them of the commitments 
they enter into thereby in respect of relationship.  
228 Act n° 94-653 of 29 July 1994, adding Article 16-7 to the Civil Code, which provides that, “All 
agreements relating to procreation or gestation on account of a third party are  void.”     
229 Act n° 94-653 of 29 July 1994, Article 18.  
230 Act n° 94-654 of 29 July 1994, Article L. 673-5.   
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Couples may donate their embryos to other infertile couples, but all frozen embryos must be 
destroyed after five years.231    In 2004, the Bioethics Laws were amended to prohibit human 
cloning and to permit stem cell research on embryos donated by their gamete donors until 
the cells are six to eight days old.232   
 
(2). Patients’ Right to Refuse Unwanted Medical Treatment  
Pregnant women’s ability to control their bodies and their health care is generally 
protected by law and the medical community, although women’s rights are overridden 
occasionally.  In 2002, an administrative tribunal in Lille affirmed a patient’s right to make 
decisions about her health care even though pregnant when it issued an injunction prohibiting 
a hospital from performing a blood transfusion on a pregnant Jehovah’s Witness over the 
patient’s objection.233 On the other hand, in 2005 the National Consultative Ethics 
                                                          
231   Article 37 de la loi n° 2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique (J.O n° 228 du 30 septembre 
2004 page 16802 texte n° 11) 
232 Loi n° 2004-800 du 6 août 2004 relative à la bioéthique, J.O n° 182 du 7 août 2004 page 14040 texte n° 
1, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/UnTexteDeJorf?numjo=SANX0100053L. Human 
reproductive cloning had been prohibited since 1997, when a decision by the National Ethics Consulting 
Committee (Commite Consultatif d’Ethique (CCNE)) determined that cloning violates human dignity, and 
therefore was outlawed by Art. 16-4 of the Civil Code.  The new law codifies this prohibition, providing a 
statutory penalty of up to twenty years in prison for this “crime against the human species.” 
Experimentation on embryonic stem cells was placed under the authority of a successor agency to the 
CCNE, the “Agence de Biomedicine,” which is to review all proposed embryonic stem cell research to 
ensure that the goal of the research be to achieve therapeutic advances, which are not attainable through 
alternative methods, and that it meet ethical standards.   In addition, the embryos to be used in such 
research must be given by the “parents” of the embryo, after they are no longer seeking to create a child.  
The new Bioethics Law has been implemented by two decrees issued by the Minister of Health, available at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte?fs_jojour=30&fs_jomois=Septembre&fs_j
oannee=2004&fs_natu=decret&fs_num=&fs_nor=&fs_jour=28&fs_mois=Septembre&fs_annee=2004&fs
_pubjour=30&fs_pubmois=Septembre&fs_pubannee=2004&fs_rech=TIT&fs_mot=loi+bioethique&check
Mot=&checkMotTit=checked&checkMotTitTex=.   
233 Tribunal Administratif de Lille, réf., 25 août 2002, no 02-3138.   In so ruling, the court relied on Article 
1111.4 of the Public Health Code, which provides, inter alia,  
In the light of information and advice supplied by healthcarers[sic] and in consultation with them, 
patients are entitled to take decisions regarding their own health. Doctors must respect wishes 
expressed by patients after informing them of the consequences of their decisions.  When refusing 
to undergo or continue treatment represents a threat to life, physicians must do their utmost to 
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Committee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE in French) issued an opinion stating that 
physicians could override a pregnant woman’s refusal of treatment in exceptional situations, 
including C-sections and blood transfusions, which occur with some frequency in the case of 
women giving birth by C-section.  The Opinion noted the difficulty of such cases, in light of 
the woman’s religious beliefs, cultural community, and the risk that a woman who had a      
C-section in France might find it more difficult to have a subsequent C-section in her home 
country, but the CCNE concluded that it was permissible to override the woman’s wishes 
because in order to save the life of the child about to be born.234  The Opinion suggested, 
however, that many of these cases could be avoided if physicians anticipated such problems 
and discussed them with patients well before an emergency arose.  The opinion urged 
physicians to endeavor to work through the issue with the patient in an atmosphere of trust, 
relying on second opinions and mediation to ensure a continuing dialogue with the patient.235  
In contrast to its approach to C-sections and blood transfusions, the Opinion declared that 
pregnant women who were HIV positive could not be forced to receive treatment to decrease 
the risk that their children would also be born with HIV.236  Importantly, the Opinion 
declared that the legal and ethical dilemma posed by patients’ refusal of treatment could not 
                                                                                                                                                                             
convince patients to accept essential treatment.  No medical act nor [sic] any treatment may be 
applied without securing free and informed consent from the person concerned.  Consent can be 
withdrawn at any time. 
Translated in the National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and Life Sciences (CCNE), Opinion 
No, 87, Treatment Refusal and Personal Autonomy, at 16 (hereafter cited as CCNE Opinion 87), or Avis 
n°87[2005] CCNE Refus de traitement et autonomie de la personne, French and English translations 
available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/francais/avis/a_087.htm.  The French text reads: « Toute personne 
prend, avec le professionnel de santé et compte tenu des informations et des préconisations qu'il lui fournit, 
les décisions concernant sa santé. Le médecin doit respecter la volonté de la personne après l'avoir informée 
des conséquences de ses choix. Si la volonté de la personne de refuser ou d'interrompre un traitement met 
sa vie en danger, le médecin doit tout mettre en oeuvre pour la convaincre d'accepter les soins 
indispensables. Aucun acte médical ni aucun traitement ne peut être pratiqué sans le consentement libre et 
éclairé de la personne et ce consentement peut être retiré à tout moment. »   
234 CCNE Opinion 87 at 6-7.   
235 CCNE Opinion 87 at 27-28.   
236 Id. at 11.  
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be solved by a reflexive application of the French legal obligation to “assist a person in 
danger.”237  
  
 (3)  Civil Actions for Causing Harm in Utero 
  French courts and Parliament have recognized limited rights to sue for damages 
caused by negligence that affected the fetus in utero.  In the landmark Nicolas Perruche case,238 
the Cour de Cassation affirmed the award of damages of €900,000 (about $1.32 million in 
current American dollars) to the parents of a child born with severe birth defects due to his 
mother’s contracting rubella while pregnant, based on the clear causal connection between 
the physician’s negligence and the harm suffered.  Madame Perruche had told her physician 
that she might have been exposed to rubella, and informed him that she would have an 
abortion if there was a risk that she would give birth to a disabled child.  However, due to the 
physician’s negligence, the mother was not informed of test results which showed that she 
had in fact contracted rubella.   
Both the Parliament and the National Consultative Ethics Committee for Health and 
Life Sciences (the CCNE) responded strongly to the Perruche decision.  The CCNE issued an 
opinion expressing its concerns about the decision’s legal and ethical consequences.239  On 
March 4, 2002, Parliament also responded, enacting a statute “governing the rights of ill 
                                                          
237 Penal Code Article 63 states that  “anybody who is able, without risk to himself or to a third party, to 
avoid either a crime or an offense against the bodily integrity of a person and who abstains from doing it 
will be punished to the same sentence as for the crime of a person who voluntarily abstains from securing 
someone.” In French the Code reads: « Quiconque pouvant empêcher par son action immédiate, sans risque 
pour lui ou pour les tiers, soit un fait qualifié de crime, soit un délit contre l'intégrité corporelle de la 
personne s'abstient volontairement de le faire. Sera puni des mêmes peines quiconque s'abstient 
volontairement de porter à une personne en péril l'assistance que sans risque pour lui ni pour les tiers il 
pouvait lui prêter, soit par son action personnelle soit en provocant un secours.» 
238 99-13.701, Arrêt du 17 novembre 2000, Cour de cassation - Assemblée plénière. 
239 The Minister particularly requested the National Consultative Ethics Committee's opinion on three 
points: the place in society of handicapped adults and children; the intrinsic value of a handicapped life as 
related to non birth; and good medical practices entailing liability on the part of prenatal diagnosis 
practitioners. See Avis n°68 [2001] CCNE available at http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/english/avis/a_068.htm 
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people and the public health system.”  The law provides that children do not have a right not 
to be born, and that a child cannot be awarded damages for wrongful birth due to a failure to 
diagnosis a condition for which the mother might have chosen abortion.240  The law permits 
suits by the parents to go forward in cases of extreme physician fault, but the damages which 
can be awarded are limited to “moral damages,” of no more than € 7,500-15,000.241 The law 
was given retroactive effect.  However, its retroactive application was found to violate Article 
34 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.242 
 
(4). Abortion Law 
Abortion has been legal in France since 1975, and access to abortion was expanded 
in 2001.  Currently, French women can obtain an abortion during the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy if they are in “a state of distress,” and wait at least seven days after their first 
request for an abortion.243  Abortions may also be performed in the second trimester if two 
physicians and a psychologist or social worker certify that the continued pregnancy poses a 
risk to the life or health of the pregnant woman or there is a risk of fetal malformation or 
                                                          
240 Article 1 of the Law  n° 2002-303 of 4 mars 2002 « relative aux droits des malades et à la qualité du 
système de santé ». In French the Law reads: « Nul ne peut se prévaloir d'un préjudice du seul fait de sa 
naissance. La personne née avec un handicap dû à une faute médicale peut obtenir la réparation de son 
préjudice lorsque l'acte fautif a provoqué directement le handicap ou l'a aggravé, ou n'a pas permis de 
prendre les mesures susceptibles de l'atténuer. Lorsque la responsabilité d'un professionnel ou d'un 
établissement de santé est engagée vis-à-vis des parents d'un enfant né avec un handicap non décelé 
pendant la grossesse à la suite d'une faute caractérisée, les parents peuvent demander une indemnité au titre 
de leur seul préjudice. Ce préjudice ne saurait inclure les charges particulières découlant, tout au long de la 
vie de l'enfant, de ce handicap. La compensation de ce dernier relève de la solidarité nationale ». 
241 Article 1 of the Law  n° 2002-303 of 4 mars 2002 and the decision of the Cour administrative d'appel 
(CAA) de Paris, troisième Chambre, 13 juin 2002, Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris contre Époux M, 
JCP E Semaine Juridique (édition entreprise), n° 15,  10/04/2003, pp. 33-34 
242 Maurice v. France, Judgment of European Court of Human Rights, June 21, 2006, available at 
http://cmiskp.echt.coe.int/tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?sessionId=1551928&skin=hudoc-en&acti....   After this 
judgment was rendered, the parties reached a negotiated settlement on the amount of damages.  See also 
“La justice suspend sa décision dans une demande de réparation pour un enfant né handicapé, » (Paris) Le 
Monde, May 21, 2005, at http://www.chirurgiens-de-
france.org/DOSSIER_DOCCHIR/DOC_05_05_21_MONDE_APPEL.htm .  
 
243 The 2001 amendments to the law eliminated the requirement of a psychological interview.  « loi relative 
à l'interruption volontaire de grossesse et à la contraception, »  Article 11 of Law No 588, July 4, 2001.   
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genetic defect.244 Minors are authorized to receive an abortion without parental consent if 
they are accompanied by another adult,245 and indeed, on “free Wednesdays,” when French 
schools are closed in the afternoon, clinics are open to teenagers to provide them with 
reproductive advice and services.  The national health system includes abortion as a covered 
procedure, with women paying about 20% of the cost, although minors and poor women 
receive free abortions.246  In practice, women must often wait three to four weeks to have an 
abortion, and two-thirds of abortions are performed at public hospitals because of the dearth 
of private physicians who perform the procedure.    
 
3. The Health Care System and Efforts to Improve Children’s Health 
(a) Efforts to Reduce Harm to Children Because of Alcohol Exposure in Utero 
  In the last several years, both government and private actors have attempted to 
reduce the incidence of fetal alcohol syndrome and other harmful effects of exposure to 
alcohol in utero.247  The problem appears particularly pronounced in poor industrial areas, 
including Robaix and Lille in northern France.  In 2004, the public prosecutor in Lille 
launched a criminal investigation against wine producers and the French government into the 
                                                          
244 Id. An abortion may be performed at “any time if two doctors of a multidisciplinary team testify that the 
continuance of the pregnancy will put the woman’s health in danger or that there is a strong probability that 
the child to be born is affected by a particularly serious disease known to be incurable,”  The French text 
reads: « L'interruption volontaire d'une grossesse peut, à toute époque, être pratiquée si deux médecins 
membres d'une équipe pluridisciplinaire attestent, après que cette équipe a rendu son avis consultatif, soit 
que la poursuite de la grossesse met en péril grave la santé de la femme, soit qu'il existe une forte 
probabilité que l'enfant à naître soit atteint d'une affection d'une particulière gravité reconnue comme 
incurable au moment du diagnostic ».  
245 Article 11 of Law No 588, July 4, 2001.  However, some physicians refuse to perform abortions for 
minors without their parents’ consent.  Danielle Hassoun, Medical Abortion in France, in Medical 
Abortion : Meeting Women’s Needs (Hobden, J., ed. 2001).  
246 Currently a surgical abortion costs between € 137 and € 213, and a medical abortion costs about € 200. 
The conditions of reimbursement were set by a decree on February 20, 1990 (arrêté du 20 février 1990) 
with the same conditions as surgical abortions.  See IUSSP International Population Conference Tours, 
France, 18-23 July 2005, available in French at 
http://iussp2005.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=52321. 
247 It has been estimated that .3 % of all French newborns, or 2,100 children annually, show symptoms of 
fetal alcohol syndrome.  CAMSP, a French medical watchdog group.  get better cite. 
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damage caused by in utero alcohol exposure, with potential charges of putting another’s life in 
danger, aggravated deception regarding merchandise (i.e., wine), and causing involuntary 
injuries.248 Perhaps in response, in 2005 the Parliament enacted a law that requires all wine 
sold in France to carry a warning against drinking by pregnant women.249  The law requires all 
wine bottles to carry a logo using the ubiquitous red circle with a line through it encircling a 
pregnant woman.250  
 
(b)  The French Health Care System in General 
France has a universal health care system, in which all legal residents are entitled to 
receive treatment. People are expected to pay for the care when it is given, and then are 
reimbursed for it, with different percentages of reimbursement depending on the type of 
care given (e.g., emergency room treatment, out-patient office visits, and prescription 
medications).251 The system is generally considered to deliver high quality care, although its 
high costs have lead to calls for modification.252  In 2004, the government tightened 
eligibility criteria for accessing the national health care system, excluding immigrants who 
have recently arrived in France.253   
                                                          
 
 
248 Get cite 
249 Law No. 2005-102 of February 11, 2005, Art. 5 Journal Officiel  Feb. 12, 2005.  
250 Stephanie Condron, Drink Labels “Should Carry a Warning for Pregnant Women,” (London)  Daily 
Telegraph Feb. 10. 2007; BBC News, French Row Over “Wine Warnings,”  Nov 25, 2005, available at 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpappspagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4469390.stm , noting that the 
labeling requirement would become effective in 2006.   
251 Rochaix and Wilsford, Health Politics (2005). 
252 N. E. J. Med. (Nov. 2004). 
253 Medicins sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders), France, Helping Undocumented Residents, Dec. 5, 
2005, available at http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=F7F24938-E018-0C72-
09773A35FE3334B3&component=toolkit.article&method=full_html 
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3.  Social and Economic Support for Children and Their Families 
France has adopted an extensive economic and social support system to encourage 
parents to have large families.  Women are granted sixteen weeks of maternity leave for their 
first child, and twenty-six weeks for their second and subsequent children.254  Men are 
granted eleven days of paid paternity leave.255  Mothers are entitled to take additional unpaid 
leave, and women whose children are very ill or disabled children are able to take additional 
leave.256 Women and families with two or more children also receive a variety of economic 
subsidies, including the Parental Education and Upbringing Allowance for families with any 
child under age three,257 and subsidized day care for children under age six.258 Single parents 
received additional support,259 and parents of school-age children also receive a once a year 
subsidy to help defray the costs of school books and clothing.260  Other supplements are 
available for larger families, and some families are eligible for housing supports.261  In 2004 
this system was modified, to consolidate and eliminate certain benefits, to be replaced with a 
single, virtually universal allowance, called the PAJE.262   
 
IV.  Speculation on the Reasons for Different Treatment of the Fetus in American, 
Canadian, and French Law 
 My research suggests four major differences in the legal regimens of the United 
States, Canada, and France, which might explain their disparate approaches to “fetal 
                                                          
254 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Starting Strong II: Early 
Childhood Education and Care 325 (2006). 
255 Id. 
256 Id., see also allocation de presence parentale (added 2001). 
257 Social Security Code Articles L. 532-1 – 532-5.  
258 Social Security Code Articles L.841-1 – L. 841.4, R. 841-1, and D. 841-1 – D. 841-5, L.842.1-R. 841.2-
842.7. 
259 Social Security Code Articles l. 524.1- 524.4. 
260 Social Security Code Article L. 543-1. 
261 Social Security Code Articles L. 831-1 – 831-7. 
262 Prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant. 
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protection.”  First and foremost is the fact that Canada and France both have strong 
national governments, with relatively little power held at the provincial, and departmental, 
level, respectively.  The second major difference is that in the United States, in contrast to 
Canada and France, the right to abortion was established through litigation rather than 
legislation.  The third significant difference is that in Canada and France, abortion and other 
reproductive health care are covered services under the national health care system. The 
fourth fundamental difference is that American prosecutors at the state level are elected and 
locally accountable, in contrast to both Canada and France, where prosecutors are appointed 
and function within a national criminal justice system. 
 
The Strength of the National Government   
The strength of the national government in Canada and France has led to the 
development of uniform laws regarding criminal law, health care (including abortion, 
biotechnology, and other aspects of medical practice), and tort law, to name several areas of 
the law, established through national legislative and judicial branches.  This stands in marked 
contrast to the United States, in which the federal and state governments are separate 
sovereign governments, with significant independent authority.  Because the United States 
government is conceptually a government of limited powers, granted to the federal 
government by the states via the Constitution, federal courts and the Congress are reluctant 
to intrude on state legislative, judicial, and executive actions, for reasons that are both 
practical and “temperamental.”  Indeed, the pluralism of the American federal system is 
often cited as a plus, with states serving as a laboratory for experimentation.263    
                                                          
263See, e.g.,  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a 
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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 The Source of Abortion Rights 
Of course, as we know, the United States Constitution does impose some important 
constraints on state actions.  But as is demonstrated by the battle over abortion that has 
raged for thirty-five years since Roe v. Wade,264 in a legal system in which access to a medical 
procedure is determined not only by fifty state legislatures and Congress, but also by a 
complex hierarchy of state and federal court judges, there are significant opportunities, not 
to say temptations, for those who oppose abortion to continue to seek to limit its 
availability.265   The fact that in the United States a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion was 
established through constitutional litigation, decided by nine justices of the Supreme Court, 
has always made the right more fragile here than in other developed nations, where access to 
abortion was hammered out in a national legislative setting, through the process of political 
horse-trading which makes compromise seem both possible and reasonable.266   
That the constitutional right to abortion is thus seen as fragile and tentative, capable 
of being overturned by the appointment of a different person to a federal appeals court or 
the Supreme Court,267 in turn means that abortion opponents will seek multiple avenues to 
undercut women’s ability to control their reproductive lives.  These include not only direct 
attempts to limit abortion access, but also more indirect efforts to challenge the analytical 
                                                          
264 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
265 Many commentators have noted the significance of the departure of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor from 
the Supreme Court and her replacement with Justice Samuel Alito in leading to a different outcome in the 
two “partial-birth abortion” cases, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) and Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 
S. Ct. 1610 (2007).  See, e.g., remarks of Talcott Camp at conference, The “Partial-Birth Abortion” Ban:  
Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal Liability, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New York, March 7, 
2008.   
266 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law 145-157 (1987).                         .  
267 See, e.g, the shift in position of the Supreme Court on so-called partial birth abortion between its 
decision in Stenberg v Carhart and Stenberg v. Gonzales, with the only notable difference being the 
departure from the court of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor and their replacement by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.    
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framework governing abortion.  Thus, statutes and regulations which recast the fetus as a 
child,268 interfere with women’s abilities to plan in advance for their health care in the event 
that they become incompetent269 or insist that women be told about possible fetal pain and 
the stages of fetal development,270 as well as the criminal prosecution of pregnant women 
addicted to alcohol and other drugs must all be seen as a means to undermine abortion, by 
making “unborn” life the full equivalent of, if not superior to, the mother’s life.   
 
Universal Health Care – or Not 
The failure of the United States to establish universal, government-funded health 
care271 has significant consequences for the debate over abortion and “fetal rights.”  This 
lack of a national health care system, which would cover abortion and birth control as part 
of routine health care, contributes to a situation in which abortion is not regarded by its 
opponents as a medical procedure, which can be chosen or rejected by a patient as part of a 
personal decisionmaking process, but as murder.  The situation in the United States 
contrasts markedly with that of France, where abortion is a fully covered procedure, 
available to all women during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and under certain 
                                                          
268This has been accomplished not only in the creation of the term “partial-birth abortion” by abortion 
opponents (see, e.g., remarks of Carole Joffe and Priscilla J. Smith, at conference, The “Partial-Birth 
Abortion” Ban: Health Care in the Shadow of Criminal Liability, Brooklyn Law School, Brooklyn, New 
York, March 7, 2008) but also in the regulations redefining a fetus as a child under the State Child Health 
Insurance Program, discussed in text accompanying n’s [77-81], supra, and the text of the Unborn Victims 
of Violence Act, discussed in text accompanying n’s [ 90 - 96], supra. 
269 These limitations placed on women’s ability to execute Advance Medical Directives are discussed in 
text accompanying n [87], supra. 
270 See text accompanying n’s [ 97 – 100], supra. 
271 A complete description of the United States health care system is beyond the scope of this paper.  
However, as most readers know,  health care in the United States is closely linked to employment.  
Medicaid, the state-federal partnership making some health care available to very low-income persons, 
does not require participating states to fund abortion, and only a handful do.  ADD cite to the Hyde 
Amendment.  
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circumstances during later stages of pregnancy.272  The United States lack of universal health 
care also contrasts with the Canadian approach, in which no criminal legislation prohibits 
abortion and abortion is a covered medical service under Medicare, the national health care 
plan.  However, as noted, in practice access to physicians who provide abortion services may 
be difficult in Canada, depending on a woman’s income and where she lives.   
 
Different Prosecutorial Systems 
Finally, the local and politicized system through which American prosecutors are 
chosen differs sharply different from the more national and professional prosecutorial 
systems of Canada and France, and contributes to the emotional pitch of the “fetal 
protection” wars.  The distinct prosecutorial systems of each nation are a product of both 
different histories and different philosophies of government.   
The local, politically accountable American prosecutor was an early innovation in the 
original thirteen colonies.  In Great Britain, a system of private prosecution developed in the 
Middle Ages and continued through the late nineteenth century, although Crown 
prosecutors were appointed by the central government (the King) in important cases.273  In 
contrast, in the American colonies prosecutors were appointed by local colonial 
authorities.274  This made sense, as the colonies were isolated and struggling small 
settlements, which were often located at great distances not only from Great Britain but 
from other outposts of British rule, and living on the edge of survival.275  The colonies’ 
cultural norms varied tremendously based on their founders, with religious orthodoxy 
                                                          
272 Though abortion is available, see discussion in text accompanying n’s [-    ], supra, the extent to which 
the government pays for it depends on the patient’s income level, as is the case with other medical 
procedures.    
273 Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American Criminal History 21 (1993); Joan A. 
Jacoby, The American Prosecutor: A Search for Identity xv, 8-9 (1980).  
274 Jacoby, supra, at 5, 15. 
275 Friedman, supra, at 23, Jacoby, supra, at 11. 
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featuring prominently in several of the colonies.276  Over time, the phenomenon of locally 
appointed prosecutors evolved into positive law, with Connecticut leading the way in 1704 
by establishing a system of county prosecutors throughout the colony.277  After the 
American Revolution, the states continued the system of local prosecutors, who acted largely 
independently within their finite geographic realms.278  Although laws were enacted at the 
state (and federal) level, as the nation moved westward and new communities were 
established along the frontier, these communities’ geographic (and sometimes cultural) 
isolation meant that local prosecutors were seen as best suited to enforce the criminal law.279  
In the wake of the Jacksonian democracy movement which swept across the United States 
beginning in the 1820s, prosecutors became elected, rather than appointed officials.280   This 
practice continues to the present, with forty-five of the fifty states electing prosecutors on 
the local level.281   
In contrast, the Canadian system of prosecution continued to follow the British 
model even after Canada gained independence from Great Britain in 1867. Consistently with 
the development of a national uniform Criminal Code,282 prosecutors at both the provincial 
and federal level initiate criminal proceedings for violations of that Code, although there is a 
division of authority depending on the crime’s subject matter.  Generally speaking, provincial 
Attorneys General and their deputies initiate criminal proceedings at the provincial level for 
violations of federal offenses which are not in the Criminal Code (such as environmental and 
other regulatory crimes) as well as most provisions of the Criminal Code.  However, 
                                                          
276 Friedman at 23-24, discussing New England, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. 
277 Jacoby, supra, at 10. 
278 Jacoby, supra, at 20-21. 
279 See id. at 22. 
280 Their election was an outgrowth of the movement to elect judges, since prosecutors were initially seen 
as judicial, not executive, officers.  Id. at 23-24.   
281 Id. at xvii. 
282 See discussion supra, in text accompanying   n’s      . 
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prosecutions of some provisions of the Criminal Code are reserved for the federal 
government, including tax offenses, elections offenses, drug crimes, money laundering, 
organized crime, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.283  Federal prosecutors are 
located in regional and national offenses, and their work is sometimes supplemented by 
private counsel who are selected to prosecute cases on behalf of the Crown,284  perhaps a 
throwback to the British system of private prosecution.  
                                                          
In France, prosecutors are actually judicial officials.  The procurer and the juge 
d’instruction285 both prosecute crimes and supervise their investigation, with the latter 
becoming involved in more serious cases.  With a relatively small number of judicial officials 
available to act in this role, the police play a more significant role in the investigatory stages 
of the prosecution than in common law countries.286  As is typical of civil law countries, 
prosecutions may also be initiated by a private party, who can also participate in the criminal 
process before and during trial.287    
 
 
 
283 Federal prosecutors also bring criminal prosecutors for violations of the Criminal Code in the three 
territories, through a group of lawyers known as the “Northern Flying Squad.” Canada, Dept of Justice, 
The Federal Prosecution Service Deskbook, Chapter 2, §§ 2.1-2.4, available at 
http://www.justice.gc/ca/en/dept/pub/fps/fpd/ch02.html, Chapter 5, §§ 5.1 – 5.6, available at 
http://www.justice.gc/ca/en/dept/pub/fps/fpd/ch05.html, and  The Public Prosecution Service of Canada, 
About the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, available at http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/bas/abt-
suj.html.  
284 The Public Prosecution Service of Canada, About the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, supra, and 
the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Agent Affairs, available at http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/aaf-
man/index.html.  
 
 
285 John Bell, Sophie Boyron, and Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law 128 (1998). L’instruction is 
the judicial process used to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify bringing a suspect to 
trial.  
286 Id. at 125. These are the judicial police, authorized by Art. 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
287 Id. at 130, 134-35; Renee Lerner Littow, The Intersection of Two Systems, supra n.  199]    , at    .  
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V. Recommendations for Change in American Law 
 Comparative law analysis can inform our understanding of American law, but a 
solution to an American social and legal problem must also reflect the unique reality of 
American institutions and sensibilities.  In the context of the “fetal protection” wars this 
reality includes an expensive, dysfunctional, and often inequitable health care system, a 
highly decentralized criminal justice system of criminal prosecution, with more than three 
thousand separate federal and state prosecutors’ offices, and a society whose cultural mores 
vary significantly along the blue to red state continuum, compounded by rapid changes in 
the population’s racial and ethnic make-up.    
 To put an end to the “fetal protection” wars, and to achieve the goal of getting more 
women necessary health care access, including drug treatment, so that their children can 
have the best chances for a life of health and success, the following four steps are both 
crucial and feasible: 1) declaring a national moratorium on prosecutions of women for fetal 
abuse, 2) expanding access to health care for women, especially pregnant women, and 3) 
improving and expanding substance abuse treatment programs, and 4) expanding the 
economic supports necessary for pregnant women and new parents.   
 
End Criminal Prosecutions 
 The most important step is to end the criminal prosecutions of pregnant women 
based on their behavior and decisions while pregnant.   Using the resources and connections 
of the National Association of Attorneys General, and the National District Attorneys 
Association, as well as advocacy groups like the ACLU Reproductive Rights Project and the 
National Advocates for Pregnant Women, and medical and public health authorities, all 
federal, state, and local prosecutors should be urged to agree to stop criminally prosecuting 
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pregnant women.  With the exception of South Carolina, the highest court in every state 
presented with a “fetal protection” prosecution has declared it unlawful.  The only 
conceivable point in initiating bringing such a criminal proceeding is for a prosecutor to 
pursue political ambitions and/or to push the state legislature to action.288  Yet the data are 
clear that such prosecutions do not deter pregnant women from abusing substances, either 
illegal or legal, because the nature of addiction is such that a drug user cannot readily stop 
her drug use.  There is no data showing that the use of criminal sanctions in addition to the 
ones already available for the underlying crime of drug use or possession have any salutary 
effect on the addict’s behavior or a general deterrence effect.   Instead, all available data 
suggest that such sanctions simply make women more fearful of revealing the problem of 
their addiction, and therefore less likely to receive the help they need.   
 
Reform the American Health Care System 
 The health care system must be reformed to guarantee health care across their lives 
to all Americans, with pregnant women and women of child-bearing age given priority in 
this reform effort.  Medicaid already pays for one-third of all American births.  How much 
better it would be to spend government money preventatively.  Young girls, teenagers, and 
women of reproductive age are much less likely to become pregnant in situations where this 
is not advisable or desired if they (and their male counterparts) have routine access to age-
appropriate health care.  This must include reproductive health care to prevent infertility, the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases, and other reproductive health problems, as 
well as pregnancy, through the provision of birth control and abortion where necessary.  
Women who are in good general health and who are able to control their reproductive lives 
                                                          
288 See Wyoming prosecutor in Michelle Foust case, supra  n.     . 
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are much less likely to become pregnant unintentionally or to continue a pregnancy when 
other aspects of their lives, ranging from being in school to being addicted to drugs, make 
having a baby unwise.  
 
Provide Effective, Non-Stigmatizing Drug Treatment 
 A major part of this health care reform must include the creation of radically 
improved drug treatment programs. Current resources for the treatment of women who 
abuse alcohol and other drugs are completely inadequate, for three reasons.  Most substance 
abuse programs fail to recognize the significant relationship between domestic violence and 
women’s mental illness and substance abuse,289 fail to acknowledge the differing treatment 
needs of men and women, and do not provide a supplementary support system which is 
necessary for pregnant women to beat their addiction. Only 14% of the drug treatment 
facilities in the United States have program specifically designed to treat pregnant and 
postpartum women.290    
 Many women who abuse drugs were sexually abused or beaten as children, and have 
significant mental health and self-esteem issues, which make it much more likely that they 
will misuse drugs.291 Women will not receive the support necessary to recover from 
addiction and mental illness unless drug treatment programs and those who work with the 
victims of domestic violence acknowledge the causal connections between domestic violence 
and substance abuse and mental illness, and actively intervene to prevent a continuation of 
                                                          
289Only 35% of drug treatment facilities in the United States have programs for persons needing treatment 
for both substance abuse and mental illness Office of Applied Studies, Substance Abuse and Mental Health 
Services Administration, Department of Health and Human Services,  National Survey of Substance Abuse 
Treatment Services (N-SSATS): 2003, Data on Substance Abuse Treatment Facilities 4 (Sept. 2004).    
290 Id.   
291 Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnancy, Domestic Violence, and the Law, supra n.  [ ]a t 477; Women’s Law 
Project, supra n.. 
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current domestic violence.292 Those who encounter domestic violence victims, including 
police, hospital staff, and social workers, need to be trained about the broader context of 
domestic violence, in order for their interventions to be appropriate and effective.293  
 Many drug treatment programs are not designed with the needs of women in mind, 
nor have they kept abreast of the latest in addiction research.  For example, traditional 
confrontational approaches, effective with male drug addicts, do not work well with women, 
and women also have better treatment outcomes in programs that are for women only.294 
For women who are long-term abusers, residential programs are most effective,295 but these 
programs must take into account the needs of women with children.296 Child care, housing, 
health care, job training, and other supports are all vital if women are to stay clean and 
become self-sufficient.297 In addition, new research suggests that new medications which 
focus on the biochemical basis of addiction may assist people in treatment who cannot 
afford, in the short term, to be in a residential program.298  Finally, more programs must 
emphasize prevention, to treat addicted women before they become pregnant.299 
 
Provide Paid Maternity and Parenting Leaves and Other Social Supports 
 If the United States truly wants to ensure that children are born healthy and are able 
to get a good start in life, state and federal governments should end their hands-off approach 
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293 Women’s Law Project, supra n. 4. 
294 Sandra L. Bloom, The PVS Disaster: Poverty, Violence, and Substance Abuse in the Lives of Women 
and Children 164 (2002); Women’s Law Project, supra n. [ ], at 8. 
295 Sandra L. Bloom, supra , at 108, citing M. Daley et al., The Impact of Substance Abuse Treatment 
Modality on Birth Weight and Health Care Expenditures, 33 (1) J. Psychoactive Drugs 57-66 (2001).  
296 Sandra L. Bloom, supra, at 1. 
297 Sandra L. Bloom, supra, at 164, citing National Institute of Drug Addiction, Treatment Methods for 
Women 13652 (1999).  
298 See Jeneen Interlandi, What Addicts Need, Newsweek, Mar. 3, 2008,  pp. 37-42.  
299 Women’s Law Project, supra n. 4. 
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to maternity and parenting leaves.300 The government, not private employers, should 
shoulder the burden of providing economic support to pregnant women and their partners 
that will permit them to take a leave from work to prepare for the birth of a child and to 
make it possible for them to choose to stay at home with a child for some time after the 
child is born, to support that child’s growth and development.  The generous benefits 
available in France, and the moderate benefits offered in Canada provide some examples to 
consider.  In addition, social support programs should be expanded to provide additional 
support for children who are at high risk for poor health care outcomes or domestic abuse 
or neglect, including abuse connected with their mothers’ drug addiction.  The include 
programs like the Nurse-Family Partnership, which has been shown in trials around the 
country to be successful in enhancing children’s health status, improving family planning, 
increasing rates of maternal employment, and decreasing families’ reliance on welfare 
programs, and generally have the biggest “bang for the buck.”301   New York City has 
recently initiated a program to connect visiting nurses with newly pregnant women who live 
in neighborhoods with high infant mortality rates.  The nurses will visit the women 
throughout pregnancy and for two years after their infants’ birth, to assist with breastfeeding, 
evaluate the infants’ health and the safety of the home environment, provide advice about 
child development, and make referrals for other necessary social and health services.302  
While realistically, in a difficult economic climate and an unabashedly capitalist society, these 
                                                          
300 See discussion of the Family-Medical Leave Act in text accompanying n’s [ -    ], supra. 
301Julia B. Isaacs, Brookings Institute Cost-Effective Investments in Children 13-16 (Jan. 2007); David L. 
Olds et al., Effects of Nurse Home-Visiting on Maternal Life Course and Child Development: Age 6 
Follow-Up Results of a Randomized Trial, 114 Pediatrics 1550 (2004); see also Lynn A. Karoly et al, Rand 
Corp., Early Childhood Interventions: Proven Results, Future Promise, at xxviii (2005)..  
302 Community Initiatives Unit Bureau of Maternal, Infant, and Reproductive Health, New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, information available at  
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/ms/ms-nfp.shtml 
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reforms may need to be phased in an incremental fashion, it is time that we acknowledged 
the need for societal support of all our nation’s children.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 It is time to move beyond the rhetoric of “fetal protection,” and to work in practical, 
non-spectacular ways to help woman escape from addiction, domestic violence, and despair.  
Only then can the United States truly take its place among developed nations in promoting 
the birth of healthy children.   
 
 
